
# The U.S. Housing and Financial Meltdown: What Happened and What Has Been the Response


James R. Barth
Auburn University and Milken Institute
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India Program
Office of International Information Programs
U.S. Department of State
November 28 - December 19, 2008

#### "Any real estate investment is a good investment ... "




"Any real estate investment is a good investment ... "



... Really?!



December 2006-October 2008




12/2006 02/2007 04/2007 06/2007 08/2007 10/2007 12/2007 02/2008 04/2008 06/2008 08/2008 10/2008

Sources: BusinessWeek, S&P, Global Insight, Milken Institute

#### **Overview**

### Home mortgages: Who borrows, how much has been borrowed, and who funds them?

Total value of housing stock = \$19.3 trillion



Note: total residential and commercial mortgages = \$14.7 trillion; 5 percent = \$700 billion


Sources: Federal Reserve, Milken Institute.


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



# I. Low interest rates and a lending boom







## II. Homeownership, prices, starts and sales take off






## III. Subprime borrowers and subprime mortgages











Percent of all outstanding home mortgages





Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association, Moody's Economy.com, Milken Institute.







Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association, Moody's Economy.com, Milken Institute.






### IV. Mortgage product innovation






#### V. Securitization










Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance, Milken Institute.

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






### **VI. Affordability**



#### VII. Collapse









## Forty-six states had falling prices in the fourth quarter 2007

United States: - 9.3% (fourth-quarter annualized growth)





Source: Freddie Mac.







#### VIII. Delinquencies and foreclosures










# Percentage of homes purchased in Q2 2008 that now have negative equity


United States = 44.8%



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#### Percentage of homes sold for a loss (Q2 2008)


**United States = 32.7%** 



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



**United States = 18.6%** 



Sources: Zillow.com, Milken Institute.

### IX. Damages scorecard






## Recent losses/write-downs and capital raised by selected financial institutions


US\$ billions, through October 31, 2008	Losses /write-downs	Capital raised
<del>Wachovia,</del> United States	96.5	11.0
Citigroup, United States	68.1	74.0
Merriii Lynch, United States	58.1	29.9
Washington Mutual, United States	45.6	12.1
UBS, Switzerland	44.2	31.6
HSBC, United Kingdom	27.4	5.0
Bank of America, United States	27.4	55.7
National City, United States	26.2	8.9
JPMorgan Chase & Co., United States	20.5	44.7
Wells Fargo, United States	17.7	30.8
Others	253.1	384.6
Grand total	684.8	688.3

Sources: Bloomberg, Milken Institute.










Note: Bear Stearns stock price is to May 2008. Countrywide stock price is to June 2008. *Sources*: Bloomberg, Milken Institute.










Note: Bear Stearns stock price is to May 2008. Countrywide stock price is to June 2008. *Sources*: Bloomberg, Milken Institute.

#### X. Credit crunch and liquidity freeze













Note: Counterparty Risk index averages the market spreads of the credit default swaps (CDS) of fifteen major credit derivatives dealers, including ABN Amro, Bank of America, BNP Paribas, Barclays Bank, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs Group, HSBC, Lehman Brothers, JPMorgan Chase, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, UBS, and Wachovia.


Sources: Datastream, Milken Institute.











### Federal Government Comes to the Rescue of Main Street and Wall Street

- Federal Reserve Programs
- Congress and the Bush administration
- Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
- Treasury, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Federal Reserve

Upper limit to total funds provided/cost under these programs...\$7.5 trillion plus ?

Program	Funding	Date announced	What it was meant to accomplish
Term Discount Window Program (TDWP)	\$111 billion as of 10/29/2008	10/17/07	Extends the term of discount window loans from overnight to up to 90 days.
Term Auction Facility (TAF)	\$301 billion as of 10/29/2008	12/12/07	The Fed auctions off loans under the TAF every Thursday for a term of 28 days. It may expand TAF lending to \$900 billion by the end of 2008.
Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF)	\$198 billion as of 10/29/2008	3/11/08	Establishes term swaps between the Fed and primary dealers. Collateral can be Treasury securities, federal agency securities and other highly rated debt securities.
Bear Stearns	Up to \$29 billion	3/14/2008	The Fed acquired \$29 billion in mortgage-backed securities from JPMorgan Chase to fund its purchase of Bear Stearns. As of October 29, the market value of these mortgage-backed securities was \$26.8 billion.

Program	Funding	Date announced	What it was meant to accomplish
Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF)	\$80 billion as of 10/29/2008	3/16/08	Extends overnight borrowing from the Federal Reserve to primary dealers.
AIG	\$85 billion as of 10/29/2008	9/16/2008	AIG received an \$85 billion, two-year secured loan on September 16, 2008, in exchange for warrants for a 79.9 percent equity stake in AIG. The firm was given an additional \$37.8 billion on October 8, and another \$20.9 billion credit line under CPFF on October 30, 2008. On November 10, Treasury purchased \$40 billion of newly issued AIG preferred stock under the TARP (potentially reducing the original loan from \$85 billion to \$60 billion).

Program	Funding	Date announced	What it was meant to accomplish
Asset Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF)	\$96 billion as of 10/29/2008	9/19/2008	Loans to banks so that they can buy asset-backed commercial paper from money market funds.
Expansion of the Federal Open Market's temporary reciprocal currency arrangements (swap lines)	Up to \$620 billion	9/29/2008	The Federal Open Market Committee authorized a \$330 billion expansion of its swap lines for U.S. dollar liquidity operations by the other central banks, raising the total cap to \$620 billion (up to \$30 billion by the Bank of Canada, \$80 billion by the Bank of England, \$120 billion by the Bank of Japan, \$15 billion by Danmarks Nationalbank, \$240 billion by the ECB, \$15 billion by the Norges Bank, \$30 billion by the Reserve Bank of Australia, \$30 billion by the Sveriges Riksbank, and \$60 billion by the Swiss National Bank).

Program	Funding	Date announced	What it was meant to accomplish
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF)	Up to \$1.8 trillion	10/7/08	The CPFF will be structured as a credit facility to a special purpose vehicle (SPV). The SPV will purchase from eligible issuers three-month U.S. dollar-denominated commercial paper through the New York Fed's primary dealers. Eligible issuers are U.S. issuers of commercial paper, including U.S. issuers with a foreign parent company.  The SPV will only purchase U.S. dollar-denominated commercial paper (including asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP)) that is rated at least A-1/P-1/F1 by a major nationally recognized statistical rating organization (NRSRO) and, if rated by multiple major NRSROs, is rated at least A-1/P-1/F1 by two or more major NRSROs. The maximum amount of a single issuer's commercial paper the SPV may own at any time will be the greatest amount of U.S. dollar-denominated commercial paper the issuer had outstanding on any day between January 1 and August 31, 2008. The SPV will not purchase additional commercial paper from an issuer whose total commercial paper outstanding to all investors (including the SPV) equals or exceeds the issuer's limit.
			This includes the \$37.8 billion loan and the \$20.9 billion credit line extended to AIG. As of 10/29/2008, \$145 billion was outstanding.

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Program	Funding	Date announced	What it was meant to accomplish
Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF)	Up to \$540 billion	10/21/08	The MMIFF provides assurance that money market mutual funds can liquidate their investments if cash is needed to cover withdrawals from customers.
Term Asset- Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF)	Up to \$200 billion	11/25/2008	TALF loans will have a one-year term, will be non-recourse to the borrower, and will be fully secured by eligible ABS. Treasury will provide \$20 billion of credit protection to the Fed in connection with the TALF. Eligible collateral will include U.S. dollar-denominated cash (that is, not synthetic) ABS that have a long-term credit rating in the highest investment-grade rating category (for example, AAA) from two or more major nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSROs) and do not have a long-term credit rating of below the highest investment-grade rating category from a major NRSRO. The underlying credit exposures of eligible ABS initially must be auto loans, student loans, credit card loans, or small business loans guaranteed by the U.S. Small Business Administration. All U.S. persons that own eligible collateral may participate in the TALF. Collateral haircuts will be established by the FRBNY for each class of eligible collateral. Haircuts will be determined based on the price volatility of each class of eligible collateral.

Program	Funding	Date announced	What it was meant to accomplish
Purchase of GSE direct obligations and MBS	Up to \$600 billion	11/25/2008	Purchases of up to \$100 billion in GSE direct obligations under the program will be conducted with the Fed's primary dealers through a series of competitive auctions and will begin in the first week of December. Purchases of up to \$500 billion in MBS will be conducted by asset managers selected via a competitive process with a goal of beginning these purchases before year-end 2008. Purchases of both direct obligations and MBS are expected to take place over several quarters.

#### **Congress and the Bush administration**

Program	Funding	Date announced	What it was meant to accomplish
FHA Secure	\$50 billion	08/31/2007	Guarantees \$50 billion in mortgages.
Economic Stimulus Act	\$124 billion	2/13/2008	Provided tax rebates in 2008. Most taxpayers below the income limit received rebates of \$300–\$600. Also gave businesses a one-time depreciation tax deduction on specific new investment and raised the limits on the value of new productive capital that may be classified as business expenses during 2008. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the net cost of the stimulus to be \$124 billion.
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008	\$24.9 billion	7/30/2008	The CBO estimates that the Act will increase budget deficits by about \$24.9 billion over the 2008 to 2018 period.
Purchase of GSE debt and equity	\$25 billion	7/30/2008	Designed to shore up Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Hope for Homeowners	Up to \$300 billion	7/30/2008	This voluntary program encourages lenders to write down the loan balances of borrowers in exchange for FHA-guaranteed loans up to 90 percent of the newly appraised home value.  Program runs through September 2011.

#### **Congress and the Bush administration**

Program	Funding	Date announced	What it was meant to accomplish
Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac	Up to \$200 billion	9/7/2008	Treasury and FHFA established contractual agreements to ensure that each company maintains a positive net worth. They are indefinite in duration and have a capacity of \$100 billion each.  Treasury also established a new secured lending credit facility, available to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks. Funding is provided directly by Treasury in exchange for eligible collateral from the GSEs (guaranteed mortgage backed securities issued by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae as well as advances made by the Federal Home Loan Banks).  To further support the availability of mortgage financing, Treasury is initiating a temporary program to purchase GSE mortgage backed securities, with size and timing subject to the discretion of the Treasury Secretary.
Guaranty Program for Money Market Funds	Up to \$50 billion	9/19/2008	To restore confidence in money market funds, Treasury made available up to \$50 billion from the Exchange Stabilization Fund.

## **Congress and the Bush administration**

Program	Funding	Date announced	What it was meant to accomplish
IRS Notice 2008-83	?	9/30/2008	Allows banks to offset their profits with losses from the loan portfolio of banks they acquire. Initial media reports indicate that Wells Fargo alone may be able to claim more than \$70 billion in losses from its acquisition of Wachovia, obtaining tax savings that exceed the market value of Wachovia as of November 7, 2008.
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA)	Up to \$700 billion	10/3/2008	Empowers Treasury to use up to \$700 billion to inject capital into financial institutions, to purchase or insure mortgage assets, and to purchase any other troubled assets necessary to promote financial market stability.
Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP)	\$179 billion as of November 7, 2008	10/14/2008	Part of the EESA, TARP allows Treasury to purchase up to \$250 billion of senior preferred shares in selected banks. The first \$125 billion was allocated to nine of the nation's largest financial institutions on October 28, 2008. An additional \$34 billion was allocated to twenty-one banks as of October 29, 2008. On November 23, 2008, Treasury purchased an additional \$20 billion of preferred shares from Citigroup.

## **Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation**

Program	Funding	Date announced	What it was meant to accomplish				
Increased FDIC insurance coverage	?	10/3/2008	A provision of the EESA temporarily raised the basic limit on federal deposit insurance coverage from \$100,000 to \$250,000 per depositor. Limits are scheduled to \$100,000 after December 31, 2009.				

# **Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation**


Program	Funding	Date announced	What it was meant to accomplish
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program	\$1.5 trillion plus?	10/14/2008	Temporarily guarantees the senior debt of all FDIC-insured institutions and their holding companies, as well as deposits in non-interest bearing deposit transaction accounts. Certain newly issued senior unsecured debt issued on or before June 30, 2009, would be fully protected in the event the issuing institution subsequently fails, or its holding company files for bankruptcy. This includes promissory notes, commercial paper, interbank funding, and any unsecured portion of secured debt. Coverage would be limited to June 30, 2012.  The other part of the program provides for a temporary unlimited guarantee of funds in noninterest-bearing transactions accounts (the Transaction Account Guarantee Program, or TAG)  On November 21, 2008, FDIC strengthened TLGP. Chief among the changes is that the debt guarantee will be triggered by payment default rather than bankruptcy or receivership. Another change is that short-term debt issued for one month or less will not be included in the TLGP. Eligible entities will have until December 5, 2008 to opt out of TLGP.


# **Treasury, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Federal Reserve**

Program	Funding	Date announced	What it was meant to accomplish
Guarantee a portion of an asset pool of loans and securities backed by residential and commercial real estate and other such assets on Citigroup's balance sheet	\$249 billion (with \$5 billion via TARP)	11/23/2008	Treasury (via TARP) takes the second loss up to \$5 billion, while FDIC takes the third loss up to \$10 billion. The Federal Reserve funds the remaining pool of assets with a non-recourse loan, subject to Citigroup's 10 percent loss sharing, at a floating rate of overnight interest swap plus 300 basis points.











# Declines in home prices and the time it takes to get the rent-to-price ratio to a targeted value


(5.04 is the longer-run average ratio)


	Annual home price decline required										
		-2.0%	-5.0%	-10.0%	-15.0%	-20.0%					
<u>.o</u>	3.80%	2010 Q3	2008 Q4	2008 Q2	2008 Q2	2008 Q2					
e ratio	4.00%	2013 Q1	2009 Q4	2008 Q3	2008 Q2	2008 Q2					
-pric	5.00%	2024 Q1	2014 Q1	2010 Q4	2009 Q3	2009 Q1					
Rent-to-price	5.04% average	2024 Q3	2014 Q2	2010 Q4	2009 Q3	2009 Q1					
Re	6.00%	2026 Q4	2017 Q3	2012 Q3	2010 Q4	2009 Q4					





# XII. What went wrong














### **Standard & Poor's ratings**

New issues: 1/1/2000 to 9/30/2008

de securities	Non-investment-	grade secur
16,907	BB+	
240	ВВ	
2,098	BB-	
	B+	
	В	
903		
1,371		
1,359	C D	
	240 2,098 3,414 2,623 2,602 2,027 903 1,371	16,907

89


# 56 percent of MBS issued from 2005 to 2007 were eventually downgraded

S&P	Total	Downgraded	Downgraded/ Total
AAA	1,032	156	15.1%
AA(+/-)	3,495	1,330	38.1%
A(+/-)	2,983	1,886	63.2%
BBB(+/-)	2,954	2,248	76.1%
BB(+/-)	789	683	86.6%
B(+/-)	8	7	87.5%
Total	11,261	6,310	56.0%

Note: A bond is considered investment grade if its credit rating is BBB- or higher by S&P. *Sources*: Inside Mortgage Finance, Milken Institute.

# Subprime mortgage-backed securities downgrades 2005–2007 issuance






# Investment grade S&P 500 companies' credit ratings and associated CDS spreads

S&P	Number of	CDS spread					
Rating	companies	Highest	Lowest	Average			
AAA	3	56	15	41			
AA+	1	95	95	95			
AA	5	86	49	74			
AA-	9	265	54	118			
A+	17	2,999	12	346			
Α	36	1,040	38	151			
Α-	34	2,557	51	427			
BBB+	43	1,114	38	222			
BBB	41	1,210	61	271			
BBB-	17	1,235	89	359			


Note: As of October 17, 2008.







#### Is adequate information disclosed to consumers?

Percent of respondents who could not correctly identify various loan costs using current disclosure forms











# XIII. Policy lessons from the current crisis and proposals for reform in regulatory oversight


#### Many different options and innovations...

- Covered bonds
- Debt-equity swaps
- Alternative mortgage products
- Shared equity mortgages
- Real estate derivatives
- Classical insurance products
- Making mortgages affordable





#### The U.S. regulatory regime: In need of reform?



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#### **Countries with the Central Bank as a supervisory authority**

Income level			ntral bank o			Centra among r superv (7 cour	nultiple visors	Centra	auth	ot a supervi ority untries)	sory
	Anguilla	Estonia	Israel	Montserrat	Slovenia	Netherlands	South Korea	Australia	Denmark	Isle of Man	Norway
	Antigua and Barbuda	Germany	Italy	New Zealand	Spain	Saudi Arabia	United States	Bahrain	Finland	Japan	Sweden
High income	Austria	Greece	Kuwait	Portugal	Taiwan, China			Belgium	France	Luxembourg	Switzerland
	Cyprus	Hong Kong, China	Liechtenstein	Singapore	Trinidad & Tobago			Canada	Iceland	Macau, China	United Kingdom
	Czech Republic							Cayman Islands	Ireland	Malta	
	Argentina	Bulgaria	Lithuania	Russia	St. Kitts and Nevis	Malaysia		Chile	Gabon	Latvia	Panama
	Belize	Croatia	Mauritius	Seychelles	St. Lucia			Costa Rica	Hungary	Lebanon	Poland
Upper middle income	Botswana	Dominica	Oman	Slovak Republic	St. Vincent and the Grenadines			Equatorial Guinea	Kazakhstan	Mexico	
	Brazil Algeria	Grenada	Romania	South Africa	Uruguay						
	Angola	Egypt	Jamaica	Maldives	Sri Lanka			Bolivia	China	Dominican Republic	Honduras
Lower middle	Armenia	Fiji	Jordan	Moldova	Suriname			Bosnia and Herzegovina	Colombia	El Salvador	Nicaragua
income	Belarus	Guyana	Lesotho	Morocco	Syrian			Cameroon	Congo	Guatemala	Peru
	Bhutan	Indonesia	Macedonia, FYR	Philippines	Thailand						
	Bangladesh	Ghana	Kyrgyz Republic	Tajikistan	Pakistan	Nigeria	Zimbabwe	Benin	Chad	Mali	Senegal
Low income	Burundi	India	Malawi	Tanzania	Uganda			Burkina Faso	Côte d'Ivoire	Niger	Togo
	Ethiopia	Kenya	Mozambique					Central African Republic	Guinea- Bissau		

#### Countries with single vs. multiple supervisory authorities

Income				upervisors			
level		(7 countries)					
	Anguilla	Cyprus	Cyprus Hong Kong, China		Singapore	Netherlands	Saudi Arabia
	Antigua and Barbuda	Czech Republic	Iceland	Luxembourg	Slovenia	South Korea	United States
High	Australia	Denmark	Ireland	Macau, China	Spain		
income	Austria	Estonia	Isle of Man	Malta	Switzerland		
IIICOIIIE	Bahrain	Finland	Israel	Montserrat	Taiwan, China		
	Belgium	France	Italy	New Zealand	Trinidad & Tobago		
	Canada	Germany	Japan	Norway	United Kingdom		
	Cayman Islands	Greece	Kuwait	Portugal	Sweden		
	Argentina	Costa Rica	Grenada	Lithuania	Seychelles	Malaysia	
	Belize	Croatia	Hungary	Mauritius	Slovak Republic		
Upper	Botswana	Dominica	Kazakhstan	Mexico	St. Kitts and Nevis		
middle	Brazil	Equatorial Guinea	Latvia	Oman	St. Lucia		
income	Bulgaria	Romania	Lebanon	Poland	St. Vincent and the Grenadines		
	Chile	Gabon	South Africa	Russia	Uruguay		
	Panama						
	Guatemala	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Egypt	Lesotho	Peru		
	Algeria	Cameroon	El Salvador	Macedonia, FYR	Philippines		
Lower	Angola	China	Fiji	Maldives	Sri Lanka		
middle income	Armenia	Colombia	Guyana	Moldova	Suriname		
IIICOIIIE	Belarus	Jordan	Honduras	Morocco	Syrian		
	Bhutan	Congo	Indonesia	Nicaragua	Thailand		
	Bolivia	Dominican Republic	Jamaica				
	Bangladesh	Chad	India	Pakistan	Togo	Nigeria	Zimbabwe
	Benin	Côte d'Ivoire	Kenya	Senegal	Uganda		
Low income	Burkina Faso	Ethiopia	Kyrgyz Republic	Tajikistan	Mali		
	Burundi	Ghana	Malawi	Tanzania	Niger		
	Central African Republic	Guinea-Bissau	Mozambique				

## Scope of supervisory authority for countries

Income		Only	banks		All of th	e main fina	ancial insti	tutions
level		(96 co	untries)		(38 countries) Australia Denmark Japan Si			
	Anguilla	Greece	Luxembourg	Slovenia	Australia	Denmark	Japan	Singapore
	Antigua and Barbuda	Hong Kong, China	Montserrat	South Korea	Austria	Estonia	Liechtenstein	Sweden
High	Canada	Isle of Man	Netherlands	Spain	Bahrain	Germany	Macau, China	Taiwan, China
income	Cyprus	Israel	New Zealand	Switzerland	Belgium	Iceland	Malta	Trinidad & Tobago
	Finland France	Italy Kuwait	Portugal Saudi Arabia	United States	Cayman Islands Czech Republic	Ireland	Norway	United Kingdom
	Argentina	Croatia	Mauritius	Seychelles	Hungary	Kazakhstan	Latvia	Malaysia
	Belize	Dominica	Mexico	Slovak Republic	Uruguay			
Harris	Botswana	Equatorial Guinea	Oman	South Africa				
Upper middle	Brazil	Gabon	Panama	St. Kitts and Nevis				
income	Bulgaria	Grenada	Poland	St. Lucia				
moome	Chile	Lebanon	Romania	St. Vincent and the Grenadines				
	Costa Rica	Lithuania	Russia					
	Algeria	Congo	Jamaica	Sri Lanka	Armenia	Colombia	Honduras	Nicaragua
Lower	Angola	Dominican Republic	Jordan	Suriname	Bhutan	Fiji	Lesotho	Peru
middle income	Belarus	Egypt	Macedonia, FYR	Syrian	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Guatemala	Maldives	
income	Bolivia	El Salvador	Moldova	Thailand				
	Cameroon	Guyana	Morocco					
	China	Indonesia	Philippines					
	Bangladesh	Côte d'Ivoire	Kyrgyz Republic	Senegal	Malawi			
	Benin	Ethiopia	Mali	Tajikistan				
Low income	Burkina Faso	Ghana	Mozambique	Tanzania				
Low income	Burundi	Guinea-Bissau	Niger	Togo				
	Central African Republic	India	Nigeria	Uganda				
	Chad	Kenya	Pakistan	Zimbabwe				