



FROM THE DIRECTOR

The latest round of parleys at Geneva reflects a degree of commitment for successfully concluding the Doha Round. Members have repeatedly reaffirmed their support to strengthening the rule based multilateral trading regime and also confirmed their willingness to make concessions and return to the negotiating table. However, a breakthrough is not in sight, yet.

Doha Development Round does seem to be stuck again and will need a special effort from its principal players, especially the 'new Quad' economies, viz. US, EU, Brazil and India, that met recently at the highest levels in Delhi. The emergence of the 'new Quad' confirms, in a marked departure from the Uruguay Round experience, that developing countries have become more involved and assertive as stakeholders in the WTO and in the ongoing Round. On one hand, this portends well for expectations of a development friendly outcome from the Doha Agenda. On the other hand, however, it does imply that a successful conclusion of the Round may take longer than in the past.

Whether the Round is successfully completed will depend on a rational and dispassionate review by all member countries of their respective positions and room for maneuver. Members have to change the current situation in which achieving a breakthrough in the negotiations could be seen by their constituencies as a political defeat. This perception must change if DDR is to succeed. In the absence of any real progress in the DDA, the bilateral agreements have become de rigueur. Developing countries are following the industrialized economies in finalizing FTAs. Thus, it appears that while all the members will continue to extol the virtues of the WTO and reaffirm their commitment to a successful DDR, FTAs will for the moment attract the real policy attention.

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LEAD ARTICLE

Will WTO Subsidy Negotiations Help Indian Farmers?

Even though efforts are being made to resume the Doha Round, the developing countries (DCs) are still waiting to see the magnitude of the reduction that EU, USA and other developed countries are ready to offer in agricultural subsidies. On the other hand, US, EU are demanding deeper cuts in industrial tariffs before they offer further ...

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Will WTO Subsidy Negotiations Help Indian Farmers?

by Surabhi Mittal

Introduction

Even though efforts are being made to resume the Doha Round, the developing countries (DCs) are still waiting to see the magnitude of the reduction that EU, USA and other developed countries are ready to offer in agricultural subsidies. On the other hand, US, EU are demanding deeper cuts in industrial tariffs before they offer further reductions in support on farm products. The key concern on the way forward remains one of finding convergence on these issues and maintaining a balance between agricultural domestic support, agricultural market access and non-agricultural market access or NAMA. India and Brazil leading the G33 group have taken a rigid stance on industrial goods unless issues in agriculture are resolved.

Inflexibility on agricultural issues is coming in the way of progress in many other important components in the Doha Development Agenda. Subsidies being the most controversial of all contentious agricultural issues, introduction of US farm bill through which amber and blue box subsidies are being shifted to green box, leading to an increase in direct payments to farmers by 10 per cent has further fuelled the ongoing debate. In this situation it is difficult to foresee a successful closure of the Doha Round. Agriculture is very crucial for India and we need to revisit our present to ensure that we obtain tangible benefits for our farmers.

OECD Domestic Support

It is well known that the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) supports its farmers in terms of direct payments, price incentives and export subsidies which artificially reduce world agricultural prices below the cost of production and inhibit the ability of developing and less developed countries farmers to compete internationally. In 2004, the value of support to producers in the OECD as a whole was estimated at USD 279 billion. Despite some major policy initiatives in 2002, there were no notable changes in the primary policy instruments in most countries. According to the official document of OECD (OECD, 2005¹), recent policy reforms in OECD have focused on changing the way in which the support is provided to the producer, with a shift away from the production linked measures. However, production linked measures continue to dominate producers' support in most OECD countries encouraging over production, distorting trade and contributing to lower world prices of agricultural commodities. The most disturbing aspect of

prevailing farm subsidy practices in OECD countries is the fact that all support to rice, sugar, and wheat is 'price support', which is well-recognized as most production and trade distortionary among policy instruments. It is believed that the removal of domestic support would lead to rise in world prices enabling competitive countries to export their produce in the world market profitably (Leetmaa, 2001²; Hoekman et.al., 2004³).

Estimates by the International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC) indicate that withdrawal of US cotton subsidies would raise cotton prices by 26 per cent. Competitive producers from other countries have suffered as a result of both lower prices for exports and loss of world market share. Hertel and Winters, 2005⁴ found that a 40 per cent reduction in agricultural tariffs, export and production subsidies could result in global welfare gains of around \$70 billion per year. It is observed that in major agricultural commodities, for most years, domestic prices are higher than world prices. Thus it is expected that the rise in the world prices of agricultural commodities would improve export prospects for India and other countries (Chand and Mathew, 2001⁵). Gulati and Narayanan⁶ (2002) believe that with the removal of trade distortions in rice, there could be trade flows from poorer to richer countries. Thus, it can be expected that poorer countries such as Vietnam, Thailand, and India would be important net exporters while the richer countries such as Japan, Korea, and the EU would turn net importers.

Impact on Prices

However this does not seem to be working in the desired manner for India. A recent study by the author⁷ using a partial equilibrium approach shows that even if the trade distorting product specific subsidies are reduced or eliminated, it will be difficult to transmit the impact of price change directly to the Indian farmers in an efficient manner. This is due to poor price transmission from the border to the farm gate. The simulation exercise carried out in the study shows that a 10 per cent rise in world prices, leads to only 0.5 per cent, 2.0 per cent, 7.3 per cent and 8.7 per cent rise in the domestic prices of rice, wheat, cotton and sugar respectively. Due to elimination of subsidies in OECD countries the world prices are expected to rise in the range of 1.1–4.9 per cent for rice, 2.6–7.4 per cent for wheat, 6.5–20.8 per cent for cotton and 7.5–26.4 per cent for sugar, depending on the elasticity of supply and demand curves. In response to this the Indian domestic prices would only increase by 0.1–0.3 per cent for rice and 0.5–1.5 per cent

for wheat; although for cotton (4.8–15.2 per cent) and sugar (7.9–28.1 per cent) the change is more likely to be in tune with rise in world price. It is evident that Indian wholesale prices are found to closely follow world reference prices in the case of both cotton and sugar but not in case of rice and wheat.

This paradox can be explained by the numerous layers of interventionist policies that prevail in the Indian agricultural sector which makes it difficult for the agricultural produce to move as per the market supply and demand forces. Government maintains an elaborate system of Minimum Support Prices (MSPs) for rice, wheat, cotton, sugar, and other crops that shield producers from adverse price swings (Elobeid and Beghin, 2005⁸; Landes et al., 2005⁹). The system of minimum support prices is perceived by the farmers as a guaranteed price for their produce when they harvest it. These are adjusted annually according to the recommendations of the Commission on Agricultural Costs and Prices, which monitors trends in domestic and world prices and costs (Landes et al., 2005). Thus institutional rigidities play a role in the adjustment process. Abbott¹⁰ (1979) observes that minimum price support schemes of this nature cause domestic prices to adjust to world market prices in the manner of partial-adjustment. Since domestic prices are constrained from directly following world prices, full adjustments never occur within a given period. High distribution costs add another layer between border prices and producer prices.

Impact on Production

On the production front, with reduction in subsidies and increase in world prices, this author's results show that the production in OECD countries would decline. OECD production is expected to decline on an average by 36 per cent for rice, 3 per cent for wheat, 51 per cent for cotton and 25 per cent for sugar. This will create supply slack in the world market which in short run would be met by an increased exports by other countries. But in the long run it is the expansion of production capability and export potential of India that will obtain maximum benefit for our farmers from removal of farm and export subsidies. The results of the study show that even if the change in world price and production scenario creates an opportunity for other competitive countries to produce and export in the world market, a discernable effect on India's production is not clearly

demonstrated. As per the latest government statistics, India's production as share of world total production is 21.5 per cent for rice, 11.6 per cent for wheat, 0.15 per cent for cotton and 8.4 per cent for sugar. In response to the rise in world price, using the supply response techniques it is found that this change would have almost negligible impact on India's production for rice and wheat. Cotton and sugar farmers in short term might increase the production on an average by 7–13 per cent for cotton and 5–18 per cent for sugar. But, these two being commercial crops, in practice the farmers' ability to respond to price changes would be inhibited by lack of access to inputs such as credits, infrastructure, markets and export oriented policies for expanding their operations. The supply side is further constrained by problems of low productivity, poor irrigation facilities, land constraint along with crop diversification in response to increasing demand of high value commodities, etc. On the production front it is also unclear, if a decline in OECD domestic support would have any noticeable effect on Indian farmers in the present situation.

Conclusion

The literature and author's results suggest that OECD policies do constrain the farmers in India and other developing countries but several domestic policies and constraints are equally responsible for the present deplorable conditions of DC farmers. The prevailing controls, intensive regulations, supply constraints, productivity issues, limited arable land and huge domestic demand in India will make it difficult for the Indian farmers to produce for exports and compete with other exporting nations to gain access to world market. Export credibility of India's agricultural exports can be judged by our random decisions to ban exports in situations of domestic crisis. If we want to make use of the future opportunity to enhance our exports due to price change then we need to work on our domestic policies along with negotiations on the WTO front. There is a need to rethink the strategy plans and realistically assess trade-offs between sectors in the Doha negotiations based on realistic gains rather than just following the tradition of protecting our agriculture. Farm and export subsidies of OECD countries are indeed an important supply constraint for Indian farmers but not the most important one. To fully exploit the gains much from WTO negotiations, appropriate domestic reforms must be undertaken on a priority basis.

¹ OECD (2005). *Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: Monitoring and Evaluation 2005*. 17th Annual Report prepared by Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Directorate of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

² Leetmaa, Susan (2001), 'Effects of eliminating EU export subsidies', Chapter 5, *Agricultural Policy Reforms in WTO, The Road Ahead*, May 2001, Economic Research Services, United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).

³ Hoekman, Bernard, Francis Ng, and Marcelo Olarreaga (2004). 'Agricultural Tariffs or Subsidies: Which Are More Important for Developing Economies?'. *The World Bank Economic Review*. Vol 18. No.2. The World Bank. Washington DC.

- ⁴ Hertel, Thomas W and Alan Winters (2005). *Putting Development Back into the Doha Agenda: Poverty Impacts of a WTO Agreement*. The World Bank, Washington D.C.
- ⁵ Chand, Ramesh and Linu Mathew (2001). 'Subsidies and Support in Agriculture: Is WTO providing Level Playing Field?'. *Economic and Political Weekly*. pp: 3014–16. August 11.
- ⁶ Gulati, Ashok and Sudha Narayanan (2002). 'Rice Trade Liberalization and Poverty'. MSSD Discussion paper No. 51. International Food Policy Research Institute. Washington DC.
- ⁷ Results are based on a study done by the author 'Effects of Global Agricultural Trade Liberalization on Agricultural Production and Poverty in India' Under the Global Research Project *Impact of Rich Countries Policies on Poverty: Perspectives from the Developing World* sponsored by GDN, January, 2007
- ⁸ Elobeid, A. and J. Beghin, (2005). 'Multilateral Trade and Agricultural Policy Reforms in Sugar Markets'. Working Paper 04-WP 356, Iowa State University, Ames.
- ⁹ Landes, M., S. MacDonald, S. Singh, T. Vollrath, (2005). *Growth Prospects for India's Cotton and Textile Industries*. Report CWS-05d-01, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington D.C.
- ¹⁰ Abbott, P., (1979). 'Modeling International Grain Trade with Government Controlled Markets'. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, Vol 61, 22–31.

WTO Chairpersons for 2007

The WTO General Council on 7 February noted the consensus on the following names of chairpersons for WTO Bodies.

Chairpersons of WTO Bodies

General Council	H.E. Mr. Muhamad NOOR (Malaysia)
Dispute Settlement Body	H.E. Mr. Bruce GOSPER (Australia)
Trade Policy Review Body	H.E. Mr. Vesa HIMANEN (Finland)
Council for Trade in Goods	H.E. Mr. Karsten Vagn NIELSEN (Denmark)
Council for Trade in Services	H.E. Mr. C. Trevor CLARKE (Barbados)
Council for TRIPS	H.E. Mr. Yonov Frederick AGAH (Nigeria)
Committee on Trade and Development	H.E. Mr. Shree Baboo Chekitan SERVANSING (Mauritius)
Committee on Balance-of- Payments Restrictions	H.E. Mr. Chitsaka CHIPAZIWA (Zimbabwe)
Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration	Mr. Tony LYNCH (New Zealand)
Committee on Trade and Environment	H.E. Mr. Manuel A.J. TEEHANKEE (Philippines)
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements	Mr. Julian METCALFE (United Kingdom)
Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance	Mr. Ravi BANGAR (India)
Working Group on Trade and Transfer of Technology	H.E. Mr. Kwabena BAAH-DUODU (Ghana)

Goods Council Chairpersons of Subsidiary Bodies

Committee on Market Access	Dr. Mohammad SAEED (Pakistan)
Committee on Agriculture	Ms. Valeria CSUKASI (Uruguay)
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures	Mr. Marnius HUIGE (Netherlands)
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices	Mr. Gareth MAYER (Australia)
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures	Mr. Pablo KLEIN (Mexico)
Committee on Safeguards	Ms. Jo McKEAGG (New Zealand)
Committee on Import Licensing	Mr. Marco J. KASSAJA (Tanzania)
Committee on Rules of Origin	Ms. Vera THORSTENSEN (Brazil)
Committee on Customs Valuation	Mr. Joe MCCLINTOCK (United Kingdom)
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade	Mr. R. S. SIDHU (India)
Committee on TRIMS	Mr. Mathias BOGAERT (Belgium)
Working Party on State Trading Enterprises	Mr. Pornvit SILA-ON (Thailand)
ITA Committee	Mr. Amr ALJOWAILY (Egypt)

Chairpersons of Bodies established under the Trade Negotiations Committee

(To serve until the next Session of the Ministerial Conference)

Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation	H.E. Mr. Eduardo Ernesto SPERISEN-YURT (Guatemala)
Negotiating Group on Market Access	Amb. Don STEPHENSON (Canada)
Negotiating Group on Rules	Amb. Guillermo Valles GALMÉS (Uruguay)
Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation	Mr. Tony MILLER (Hong Kong, China)
Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services	Amb. Fernando de MATEO y VENTURINI (Mexico)
Special Session of the Council for TRIPS	Amb. Manzoor AHMAD (Pakistan)
Special Session of the Dispute Settlement Body	Amb. Ronald SABORÍO SOTO (Costa Rica)
Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture	Amb. Crawford FALCONER (New Zealand)
Sub-Committee on Cotton	Amb. Crawford FALCONER (New Zealand)
Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Environment	Amb. Toufiq ALI (Bangladesh)
Special Session of the Committee on Trade and Development	Amb. Burhan GAFOOR (Singapore)

School Brief

Private Standards on SPS and TBT: Non-Tariff Barriers or Regulatory Requirements?

by Suparna Karmakar

Introduction

Technical standards on traded products and their application have featured in WTO news of late, insofar as they are becoming veritable market access barriers. In particular, the bone of contention seems to be the existence and proliferation of private and commercial standards in developed countries. While it is being discussed extensively in the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Committee, where this issue was first raised almost two years ago, similar concerns have been raised by developing country exporters even on the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) issues for a much longer period of time. The debate has shifted gear after the SPS committee decided to make it a separate agenda item (it was previously one among many “specific trade concerns”). This issue takes the SPS Committee into comparatively new territory. The committee generally deals with standards set by international standards-setting bodies and the mandatory regulations imposed by governments. But some developing countries have started to question the standards set by the private sector, such as supermarket chains.

The 28 February–1 March 2007 meeting of the SPS Committee saw several papers submitted on the issue. For this meeting, a number of new documents were circulated from the Secretariat, some governments, and observer organizations, focusing on how standards can impact the trading opportunities of developing countries. An 8-page Secretariat paper¹ looks at examples of private standards (individual firms, collective national schemes and collective international schemes) and the trade issues they raise, and how these relate to the WTO’s SPS Agreement, particularly Article 13. It concludes with issues the SPS Committee might consider.

The Problem

Standards and Technical regulations to protect the

safety and health of plants, animals and for environmental protection are allowed to be implemented by Member countries under the WTO’s SPS and TBT Agreements. However, the Agreements also provide guidance in that the national standards would be encouraged to follow as closely as possible, the existing international standards; in sectors/products where international standards do not exist, Members should encourage formulation of international standards based on best practices in different national standards. Members are also required to notify to the WTO all such measures in force in their national territories in the interest of transparency, though such notifications have not been forthcoming as was expected. On the contrary, standards have proliferated to address a wide range of issues, from quality assurance, food safety, working conditions, energy efficiency, to various ethical, environmental and social concerns. Meeting these standards is a key policy concern, especially in developing countries. More generally, understanding the making, applications and working conditions, and implications of these standards is very important for policy makers as well as producers’ associations and export associations.

This problem compounds in case of private standards, which are often more complex and stringent than those set by national governments and add to confusion by their multiplicity. Although these private standards are voluntary and not required by law, they are required for doing business (a good marketing tool), thus becoming de facto mandatory. The increasing use of private standards has raised concerns about market access for developing country producers, in particular small and medium producers, who may be capital constrained at the firm level and operate in countries whose lack of adequate infrastructure and services makes compliance difficult and costly. A recent OECD study identified three key

developments in the food sector over the past decade: (1) the move to voluntary management systems for the monitoring of product and process attributes; (2) the emergence of coalitions of firms for setting private collective voluntary standards; and (3) the increased use of global business to business (B2B) standards.² An ongoing study³ by this author on the electrical and electronic machinery sector in India also finds similar developments in the internationally integrated manufactured product chains. Among the most difficult requirements or challenges cited by exporters were: record keeping by manufacturers/down-stream supply chain; chemical use verification (which is expected to increase further with the new requirements under the EU REACH legislation); management of different standards systems and their compliance; certification, in particular for attesting to good manufacturing practices; transforming the mindset of suppliers, particularly small and medium companies; and meeting diverse country and state regulations, especially those that are in variance with the national requirements.

As expected, WTO Members (and also the exporters in these countries) are divided in their opinion vis-à-vis the trade related implications of technical standards, in particular the private standards. It is felt by some that standards set by private sector bodies create trade because exporters meeting these standards can sell their products in target markets more easily; but they can also make life difficult for small suppliers. In fact, these private (voluntary) standards create multiple vertical silos of production and consumer chains, which are also limited in their interoperability given the entrenched preferences that creative marketing strategies ensure.

Concerns are two-fold. First, the proliferation of standards that are set without consultation poses a challenge for small economies, and private standards often conflict with those set by governments or international organizations. Meeting the standards also raises costs. Second, in practice these voluntary private standards become compulsory; if a supplier does not comply, it is excluded from the market. There is a further risk of losing sight of official standards if countries focus too much on private norms. Among the specific concerns raised were complaints about the length of time some countries take to assess risk and approve imports, and what some countries consider to be importing nations'

failure to follow international standards or to base their actions on science.

While these concerns are acknowledged, the developed countries have been maintaining their inability to refuse stakeholders from setting private standards and stringent efficiency norms, citing the specific organizational structure in their economies where private sector organizations are allowed to set standards reflecting "consumer demand". Certification requirements are also de facto more expensive than stated. For example, it was revealed in an interview that for some consumer goods products that could be self-certified in EU, a third party certification stamp often helps to market the product better, "since the average consumer in the developed country market has been conditioned to look for the certification mark".

Action Taken So Far

In all likelihood, private standards will continue to increase in scope and stringency overtime. The only way out therefore is for the developing country producers to adapt upwards to the higher standards in demand in certain markets. With this realism in view, the WTO SPS Committee in their paper has come up with possible means of addressing the problem. Among these are: the relationship between private and international standard-setting bodies; what governments might do to live up to their obligation to ensure that private bodies comply with the SPS Agreement; the relationship with other areas of WTO work such as technical barriers to trade; and "equivalence"—authorities accepting different measures which provide the same level of health protection for food, animals and plants, particularly to help developing countries that use less sophisticated health and safety technologies. Harmonization efforts by coalitions of private organizations often involve benchmarking of alternate private schemes. Such benchmarking, however, does not always result in equivalence.

Others suggest greater assistance in upgrading these producers to meet the standard and the new competitive economic environment. Concrete action on this has been seen on capacity building in developing and least-developed countries on both SPS and TBT. Leading developed countries have renewed their commitment to SPS capacity building and technical assistance

programmes of the WTO by fresh donations for the Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF), a programme set up for the purpose jointly by the World Trade Organization, the World Health Organization, the World Bank, the World Organization for Animal Health, and the Food and Agriculture Organization.

The facility's purpose is to help developing countries improve their expertise and their capacity to analyse and implement international SPS standards. This will improve their human, animal and plant health situation, and ability to gain and maintain market access. The United States has given US\$110,000 (approximately 136,000 Swiss francs) and the United Kingdom has paid £500,000 (approximately 1,190,000 Swiss francs) to help developing countries analyse and implement the SPS standards. Work on technical co-operation co-ordination will be at the

forefront of the STDF's work programme in 2007.

While the STDF facility focuses mainly on SPS-related technical assistance and the identification of related good practice, technical capacity building on TBT issues are undertaken by the WTO under its Technical Assistance programme of the TBT Committee. Technical Assistance related to TBT is deemed essential to the participation of developing and least developed countries in the multilateral trading system. It allows them to effectively implement as well as benefit from the TBT Agreement. However, more needs to be done to help Members with the "know-how" as well as the "know why" of standards and technical regulations, so as to enable them to gain expertise and understanding in managing these complex realities of modern day international trade.

¹ Document [G/SPS/GEN/746](#) of 24 January 2007

² OECD, (2006): *Private Standard Schemes and Developing Country Access to Global Value Chains: Challenges and Opportunities Emerging from Four Case Studies*. Also see, Fulponi, L (2006): "Private voluntary standards in the food system: the perspective of major food retailers in OECD countries", *Food Policy*, 31:1 1-13.

³ A MOC commissioned study on the Non Tariff Measures affecting Indian exports in Electrical and Electronic Machinery and Pharmaceutical sectors.

***International Workshop on
"Intra Asian FDI Flows: Magnitude, Trends, Prospects and Policy Implications"
April 25 and 26, 2007
Casurina Hall, India Habitat Centre, Lodhi Road, New Delhi***

Intra Asian integration has meant integration of not only trade flows, business cycle synchronization but also intensification of intra Asian capital flows. Intra regional FDI flows have been demonstrated by intra regional investments by companies from Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan and recently by increased global investments and Asian investments by Chinese and Indian companies. Estimates suggest that such South FDI accounts for almost 37% of total FDI flows to developing countries with a three fold increase from \$14 billion in 1995 to \$47 billion in 2003.

Keeping in view that such global and inter regional investments by Asian companies is expected to rise, ICRIER is organizing an International Workshop on 'Intra Asian FDI Flows: Magnitude, Trends, Prospects and Policy Implications' where several aspects of Asian investment flows would be analysed by Dr. Ramkishan Rajan, Associate Professor, George Mason University; Dr. Rabin Hattari, IMF and George Mason University; Dr. Dilek Aykut, World Bank; Dr. Shaoming Cheng, West Virginia University; Dr. Roger Stough, George Mason University; Dr. Rajat Kathuria, Professor, International Management Institute; Dr. Andrea Goldstein, OECD; Dr. Joshua Felman, Senior Resident Representative, IMF; Dr. Christopher Findlay, University of Adelaide, among others.

To register, please contact : Mr. Anil Kumar Gupta, ICRIER, at 24645218-20 or akumar@icrier.res.in

Environment Negotiations in the Doha Trade Round

by Atul Kaushik¹

Introduction

The number of times the Director General of WTO Pascal Lamy has warned the WTO Members of an impending deadline for the Doha Round of negotiations and then refreshed the warning with a new deadline gives an impression that the Membership is not finding any meeting ground. The Uruguay Round went through similar hiccups for eight long years before finally closing a deal of tremendous significance worldwide in the wee hours of 16 December 1993. Shifting deadlines are normal where trade negotiations are concerned.

It was quite clear, early in the run up to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round that big ticket commitments on trade and environment would not find a place in the end results. However, the internal pressure faced by the many GATT Parties, particularly the European countries, from their constituencies ensured that sustainable development found mention in the preamble of the WTO Agreement. Further, a decision was taken to establish a Committee on Trade & Environment (CTE) to arrive at appropriate recommendations on 10 diverse issues spanning the interface between trade and environment. After an intensely negotiated report² to the Singapore Ministerial Conference of the WTO in 1996, not much came out of the deliberations of CTE for the next five years in terms of formulating rules in the area of the environment. However, again because of the pressure from constituencies, Members could not ignore the environmental issues while negotiating in the Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001 that launched the current Round. It did not surprise the legal eagles that the mandate was much loaded against the environmentally active community in terms of tangible results.

This article first outlines the various areas³ of negotiations on trade and environment set out in the Doha Ministerial Declaration (DMD). It then explores possible end results of these negotiations and how India needs to prepare for these outcomes.

Areas for Negotiations

Negotiations have been launched in three areas, though the outcomes of the first two are not meant to change the existing rights and obligations of WTO Members⁴. The first establishes the relationship between rules of the WTO and Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs). It is clarified that the negotiations shall be limited in scope to the applicability of existing WTO rules as among parties to the relevant MEA. It is further clarified that rights of WTO Members who are not parties to the relevant MEA shall not be prejudiced. These riders demonstrate the intensive backroom negotiations that must have gone into producing such a truncated mandate to negotiate.

The second area for negotiation is to set up procedures for exchange of information between MEA Secretariats and WTO and the criteria for granting observer status. Information exchange is already underway directly through MEA presentations or through information supplied by Members, though a more structured information exchange would be useful. The issue of observer status of MEAs is embroiled in a larger controversy about observer status in the WTO General Council.

The third area of negotiation is the reduction/elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and services (EGS). This area of negotiation is not subject to the condition that the outcome shall not alter the existing balance of rights and obligations. Progress, nevertheless, has been slow and tedious because of diverse approaches of the Membership on the issue.

Environmental Goods and Services

Let us consider the least encumbered area of negotiations first: EGS. Realizing that defining environmental goods would be an extremely complicated exercise, negotiators focused on the so-called List Approach where Members including all the QUAD⁵ countries

introduced lists of environmental goods on which tariffs should be reduced or eliminated. Most of the items on the list have been imported from work done by the OECD and APEC. The focus is on environmental technologies, which are primarily of export interest to the developed world. A counter proposal by India that is garnering increased support from many developing countries is the so-called Environmental Project Approach (EPA). After developing some broad criteria for "Environmental Projects" to be agreed upon in the negotiations, this approach leaves the operationalization of tariff reduction/elimination to Members. How trade liberalization through this approach can be quantified and woven into the ultimate results of the round is still under discussion. A hybrid approach, the so-called Integrated Approach has been proposed by Argentina. The negotiators in this approach should first identify the environmental project categories and then negotiate the goods to be included in each such category, the reduction/elimination to be committed and the period of availability of the benefit.

Studies have shown that if ever a list of environmental goods is agreed upon for reduction/elimination of tariffs, the major benefactor would be the high-end technology intensive industries of developed countries⁶. Some developing countries have a comparative advantage in certain environmentally preferable products. However, either because of low volume of trade or because of already low tariffs on these items in the developed world, the benefit to the developing country industry is minimal. The developing countries are, therefore, at a loss as to how they can maximize their gains from these negotiations except by leveraging the results here with some benefits in other areas of negotiations such as lower tariffs on textiles and leather products or addressing some major constituency concern, such as more flexibilities in the intellectual property regime or leveraging their wealth of biological diversity for better market access. In this scenario, results of the environment negotiations may be acceptable to developing countries only if they try to crunch numbers and propose politically acceptable balances.

Negotiations on environmental services are being carried out primarily in the Services negotiating group, where some Members like some developing countries have referred to Paragraph 31 (iii) of the DMD, while others like the US have not mentioned it at all. It is expected that the results of the Services negotiations will be decisive for the negotiations on environmental services as well.

The domestic industry in India would be well advised to identify products and services in which it has comparative advantage which can qualify as environmental goods and services or become parts of environmental projects. Inputs from the industry based on such an analysis could assist negotiators in refining their demands for a balanced outcome.

Multilateral Environment Agreements

There is potential for conflict between trade measures in MEAs and, in particular, Articles I and III of GATT⁷. Some of these trade measures may be defended under the exceptions clause (Article XX) of GATT, but not all trade measures may be saved from a challenge by this exceptions clause. While WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body have become more conscious of the environmental dimensions of the arguments in such conflicts⁸, as compared to the GATT panels⁹, they may not be able to take the 'environment view' in many cases, such as where a trade measure in a MEA is directed against non-parties primarily to compel them to change their policies¹⁰.

The relationship between the multilateral trading system and the MEAs has been discussed since the 1970s in GATT and WTO, but the parties do not appear to be converging in on any action plan. There are many reasons for this impasse. First, there is no commonly accepted definition of an MEA. Second, since different departments of governments represent parties to international negotiations on trade on the one hand and environment on the other, there is not necessarily any coherence in the national stand taken by them in these negotiations. Even where attempts are made to provide such coherence, the questions of hierarchy between trade agreements and environment agreements is deliberately left unresolved in order to get an agreement on the extant issue before

the negotiators¹¹. Thirdly, the only agreed text¹² on the issue emanating out of the WTO recalled that there had been no dispute in the GATT/WTO on trade measures in MEAs, and none was likely in the future¹³. After examining the characteristics of trade measures used in MEAs, it concluded that problems were unlikely to arise in the WTO over trade measures agreed and applied among parties to an MEA and suggested that care be taken in negotiations for future MEAs on how trade measures might be considered for application to non-parties.

The NGOs active in the field of environment are frustrated¹⁴ by the lack of action in the WTO on the question, more because they wish to obtain a clear direction that environmental agreements will prevail over the WTO rules rather than to have clear rules *per se*.

Paragraph 31 (i) of the DMD has not seen many concrete proposals except the Draft Decision proposed by the EC¹⁵ in June 2006 calling upon the trade bodies, including panels, to defer to MEAs on any issue with environmental content. Most WTO Members have questioned the nature of obligations intended to be imposed through the Decision proposed by the EC, even if the objections have been nuanced through a set of questions or clarifications sought from the EC. India, on its part, had made a submission in early 2003 providing some thresholds for identifying what could constitute an MEA and what would constitute a specific trade obligation and seeking further discussion on the subject. The discussion in the Special Session of the CTE on this issue, as discernable from the minutes of its meetings available from the WTO website, does not appear to be heading for an agreement in the near future. Nevertheless, if the WTO Members were persuaded to have some disciplines on this issue as part of a package in the end, India would need to examine more specifically its interests in terms of various trade obligations it has taken or is likely to take in the future in MEAs.

India is party to most of the MEAs that may constitute the substratum of MEAs whose trade measures may come up for considering compatibility with the WTO rules¹⁶. It is not yet clear whether the trading permits

included in the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change would constitute a trade measure, but if they do, India is party to that MEA as well. However, in many of these MEAs, some of the major WTO Members are not party or have not ratified them. It would be an unnecessary obligation to take for India if we were to consider trade measures in such MEAs as *per se* compatible with the WTO rules when these other Members do not even have an obligation to meet the required standards¹⁷. This could adversely affect our competitiveness in the marketplace.

Some suggestions can be considered in case the negotiations in this area make some progress. First, as already submitted by India, specific trade measures that WTO rules should show deference to must be specific, with a trade element, and should be in the nature of an obligation. It may be useful to consider whether a case can be made that WTO rules show deference to trade measures in an MEA only where all the WTO Members are party to the MEA as well. That will ensure that India takes on obligations on environment only to the extent that similar obligations have been taken by all other WTO Members. Further, it would be prudent to negotiate future MEAs, as has been done in the past, in full consonance with the Agenda 21 edict about common but differentiated responsibilities of nations on environmental protection. This would provide the necessary development dimension to the specific trade measures in MEAs.

Information Exchange and Observer Status

There is a demand from many WTO Members about a better information exchange mechanism between MEAs and the WTO. In itself, this is not a very difficult demand to meet; in fact, such information exchange already takes place, either through representatives of the Secretariats of the MEAs which already have an observer status in the WTO Committees, or through presentations made by WTO Members which are parties to the MEAs and wish to share happenings there with WTO Members. The problem area here has been that WTO, due to its Member driven nature, has not been able to provide responses to questions or clarifications sought by MEA Secretariats. Unless

an authoritative interpretation of any trade rule has been made through the mechanism¹⁸ for such interpretations in the WTO (and none has been made in the history of WTO so far), Committees are seldom in a position to provide answers to such question or clarifications. It is no wonder, therefore, that the negotiators have limited their ambition to information exchange.

The difficult part of this negotiating area is the stalemate on the grant of observer status to MEAs. This stalemate arises out of a decision of the WTO to grant such status by a General Council Decision, and the inability of the General Council to take any decision on this matter because of political difficulties in accepting as observers some non-trade organizations whose request for observer status has been pending for a long time. Some way might have to be found to dissociate the issue of grant of observer status to MEAs in the CTE from the general question of grant of observer status in WTO bodies.

Conclusions

Many deadlines later, the international community may yet see an end to the Doha round and a revival of the faith in the multilateral trading system. When that happens, some of the issues on trade and environment may also get resolved and result in new obligations. Europe has already expended

considerable political capital on environment in the WTO. The United States may also get some direction from its Senate to get some substantive outcomes on environment in the Doha round¹⁹. Given the constituency pressure, a deal on at least certain negotiating areas (most likely on the EGS issue) related to trade and environment may not be unlikely provided there is enough in the results on major areas like agriculture tariffs and subsidies and industrial tariffs. Therefore, it would be essential for India to prepare its bottom-line well in time.

India is a developing country, even if with a fast growing economy, and sustainable development is clearly a preferred option to reckless use of environmental resources. However, in its efforts along with other WTO Members to conclude the negotiations, India should remain mindful that it has imposed a much lesser burden on global environment than some of its major trading partners, and any obligations it takes should be commensurate with its role, historically and at present, in adding to this planet's environmental woes. This should translate into figuring out better market access opportunities when concluding a deal on EGS and an equitable burden of obligations or commitments amongst WTO Members when looking for a result on the WTO–MEA interface.

¹ Formerly First Secretary, Permanent Mission of India to the WTO, Geneva. The views expressed here are personal.

² WT/CTE/1 available at <http://www.wto.org>

³ This article limits itself to the areas of negotiations set out in Paragraph 31 of the DMD available at <http://www.wto.org>. Note that paragraphs 32 and 33 also come under the title "Trade and Environment", but they do not mandate negotiations; the first is an instruction to the CTE to give particular attention to three issues in pursuing its work, and the second refers to the need for technical assistance and capacity building for developing countries. This paper also does not discuss fisheries subsidies, negotiations on which have been mandated in the DMD under Rules negotiations (paragraph 28) though a mention is made in paragraph 31 also.

⁴ Paragraph 32, *ibid*, provides inter-alia that outcome of negotiations on relationship between MEAs and WTO and the procedures to be developed for information exchange between MEA Secretariats and the WTO committees shall not add to or diminish the rights and obligations of Members under the existing WTO agreements nor alter the balance of these rights and obligations.

⁵ The so-called Quadrilateral of countries, a term more relevant during the Uruguay Round, and comprising of the United States, the European Communities, Japan and Canada.

⁶ See http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c1em21d2_en.pdf, in particular paragraph 73.

⁷ See, generally, "Environmental Treaties and Trade: Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the Multilateral Trading System" by Duncan Brack in "Trade, Environment, and the Millennium" Second Edition, Eds. Gary P. Sampson and W. Bradnee Chambers, United Nations University Press.

⁸ The Shrimp-Turtle dispute in the WTO is an example. See WT/DS58/AB/R at <http://www.wto.org>.

⁹ The Tuna-Dolphin dispute in GATT is an example. See GATT Document DS29/R (unadopted).

¹⁰ See the Montreal Protocol, for example.

¹¹ Some MEAs insert preambular language to the effect that MEAs and the multilateral trading system are and should be mutually supportive.

¹² See WT/CTE/1 at endnote ii above.

¹³ This prophecy has stood its ground so far despite some close shaves like an issue raised by Zimbabwe on CITES, potential and existing disputes relating to the Convention on Biological Diversity or the Cartagena Protocol thereto etc. In the latest case (WT/DS293/R – the Biotech dispute), the Panel stated that while it was not obliged to take into account the provisions of the Cartagena Protocol, it had the option to do so, and it chose not to do so as the measures at issue in that case were not taken to implement the Cartagena Protocol.

¹⁴ See, for example, “Is the WTO the only Way?” a briefing paper by Adelphi Consult, Friends of the Earth Europe and Greenpeace.

¹⁵ See TN/TE/W/68

¹⁶ Early in these negotiations a set of 20 MEAs was identified in WTO Secretariat papers as having trade measures in them, and India is a party to all the international MEAs mentioned therein. Examples include the CITES, Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Substances and their Disposal, the Cartagena Protocol on Bio-safety, the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedures for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants etc.

¹⁷ Perhaps given the implications of such an obligation, the Indian Prime Minister is reported to have hoped that climate change is not introduced as an additional obligation in trade negotiations as that will only complicate the negotiations. See news article titled “Keep climate out of WTO: PM” in the Hindustan Times dated 14 March 2007.

¹⁸ Article IX: 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation.

¹⁹ A report on the USINFO website (<http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html>) dated 23 January 2007 has a sub-title “President’s fast track negotiating unlikely without environmental focus”. However, a closer scrutiny of the report shows that the Democrats in the US Senate may push more for labour standards than for environmental standards.


ICRIER News and Events on WTO Issues

Multilateralism under Threat

Addressing a select gathering of trade economists and policymakers at the ICRIER–SRTT seminar on “Multilateralism under Threat”, on 29 January, 2007 Anne Krueger, Visiting Professor ICRIER, said that “Multilateralism has been the key to the huge economic successes of the past half century. However, the achievements of the multilateral economic system, especially that of the IMF, World Bank and the erstwhile GATT (now WTO), have been underappreciated and ever more taken for granted, while the need for a well-functioning multilateral international economic system is greater than ever as globalization proceeds.” She was of the firm view that these institutions need to be reformed and strengthened rather than abandoned.

Prof. Krueger retraced global economic experiences since World War II and considered some of the reasons why multilateralism is so important, mostly since MFN is a guarantee against the

competitive devaluations that arise when countries take measures designed to boost exports which get nullified when others retaliate (third country effects). She outlined some of the successes of the multilateral financial institutions over the past sixty years and turned to the reasons why support for the system is not as strong as one would expect in light of its accomplishments. In her view the four key concerns regarding the prospects of



L to R : Dr. Anne O. Krueger, former First Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund; Mr. Gopal K. Pillai, Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry and Dr. Rajiv Kumar, Director & CE, ICRIER

multilateralism today emanate from (a) recent proliferation of PTAs; (b) the absence of a multilateral regime to govern private capital flows; (c) short-term protectionist moves of world economic powers which undermine the multilateral system; and (d) lack of leadership from the rapidly growing middle income countries like India and China.

While discussing the importance of multilateralism she mentioned that in a non-rule based scenario, compliance would necessarily have to be ensured through economic sanctions, which however is not easy to implement for the developing countries and cannot be effective unless all countries together agree to impose them. Even experiences with 'voluntary export restraints' and 'anti-dumping and countervailing duty administration' have proved inefficient. A non-discriminatory rule-based multilateral system, in her view, remains the only hope of the developing and least-developed countries to create a level playing field in today's world. Multilateralism is the only guarantee against trade diversion and other market distortions brought about by preferential trade and investment agreements.

The seminar chair, Commerce Secretary Mr. Gopal K. Pillai pointed out that the agricultural policies of the world's leading economies needed to be rethought in the interest of multilateralism and its survival. Sustainability of growth and development policies in a multilateral context also merited paying closer attention to their environmental impact. The lecture was followed by a detailed discussion of several contemporary problems afflicting the global economy.

Painful Geopolitics, Stellar Goeconomics: Can Globalisation continue to apply to one, but not the other?

At this 22 February 2007 seminar on the political economy of globalization, Mr Bill Emmott, former editor of *The Economist*, analysed why the current global economic boom had simply not been forecast. In fact IMF World Economic Outlook in 2002 had forecast that oil and commodity prices

would first stabilize and would probably then begin to fall in the coming couple of years. However, despite the concerns on its short term sustainability, threats of political tensions in the Middle East and rise of oil prices, globalization seems to continue, thanks to demand in China and India and elsewhere, with increases in trade and capital flows. In particular he highlighted the fact that "the markets have not been taken seriously in either the credit markets or currency markets or the stock markets, and however much we worry about the confrontation with either Iran or with North Korea the economy does not seem to worry about it."

The three issues Mr Emmott addressed in his talk are: (1) How do we resolve this apparent paradox? (2) If this sort of politics does not derail globalization and the rapid rise of the global economy, what might? And (3) what sort of future might we expect for the global economy in the rest of this decade and a little beyond.

On the first, his view is that the politics are really not actually as bad as they look in so far as they have an impact on global trade and investment flows. Statistics put out by the United Nations in the peacekeeping department point out that actually if one counts the number of wars going on, in fact they have declined substantially from the 1990s. Further, these are not multi-country wars, and while they involve insurgency and civil war, they do not disrupt trade and investment. In contrast, he pointed out that the current global economic upturn derives from a different political cycle, namely, from the end of the Cold War and the continued dividend from long term influence of the liberalization and opening up of the world economy. That is of course clearly in part India's dividend but also it reflects the broader liberalization that has encouraged a lot of the emerging market growth that we have experienced today.

Answering his second poser, he said that a derailment of current economic stability would come only if the major powers return to confrontational mode, especially between China

and US, India and Russia, and Japan and EU. Second, political instability within one or more of the major trading powers, most critically China could also pose a risk to economic stability. A third threat could emerge from rising protectionism, but that is not a high probability. His forecast prospects for the global economy were therefore essentially of a positive trend in the near future. In particular, in his view, the momentum of globalization and reform continue to be strong all around the world, even in Europe.



L to R : Mr. Bill Emmott, former editor of 'The Economist' and Dr. Rajiv Kumar, Director & CE, ICRIER

Recent Developments in WTO

by Shravani Prakash

Doha Round Negotiations Resumed: Lamy calls for Full Speed Negotiations

Negotiations under the Doha Round were restarted after a six-month impasse. Director General Pascal Lamy in his report to the WTO General Council in February 2007 said that negotiations have resumed fully across the board and that "political conditions are now more favourable for the conclusion of the Round than they have been for a long time". He added that "political leaders around the world clearly want us to get fully back to business, although we in turn need their continuing commitment".

Clear signals for a renewed commitment to put the Doha Round back on track were already apparent at the Ministerial gathering in Davos earlier this year. Mr Lamy made particular reference to the event, stating that "This confirmed my feeling that that we needed to restart the multilateral process fully, to try to reap the benefits of this new mood". The Ministers present at that meeting supported a

quick resumption of full scale activity in the different Negotiating Groups and declared that flexibilities were available within their mandates.

DG Lamy said that in his view there is no need to set any false deadlines. While there was the urgency of completing the task ahead, it was also important to reach a substantive outcome that is acceptable to everyone. Addressing an international seminar in New Delhi in March, he also stated that there was need for full speed resumption of the multilateral process of negotiations as time is not on our side. "We need to speed up the process so as to grasp the window of opportunity which closes by the end of June with the expiry of the US Trade Promotion Authority", he said. He also underlined the development potential of the Doha Round in agriculture, industrial goods, services and other areas of the negotiations

SPS Committee hears issue of setting Private Standards

The WTO's committee dealing with food safety and

animal and plant health heard the debate on private standards such as those demanded by supermarket chains etc. Standards set by private sector bodies can boost trade, but they can also make life difficult for small suppliers. The SPS Committee debated on how the private sector standards fall under the WTO's SPS Agreement, if at all they do, and their economic implications for various countries.

Members, such as Chile and EU, said that private standards can create trade as exporters meeting the standards can sell their products more easily. However, some members like Egypt, Cuba and Brazil said that proliferation of standards that are set without consultation pose a challenge for small economies, and meeting these standards raises costs. Some countries, such as Argentina argued that in practice these voluntary private standards can become compulsory as non-complying suppliers are gradually excluded from the market. A number of countries felt that helping developing countries comply with official standards should be prioritized, instead of focusing too much on private norms.

High Level Session on Cotton shows need for result in cotton talks

Concluding a High Level Session on cotton at the WTO, Director-General Pascal Lamy said that it was clear that talks on cotton need a breakthrough in the Doha Round negotiations, and that more is needed to remove blockages on development assistance. "I can confidently say there will not be a Doha Round outcome unless we deliver on cotton," he said. The session was attended by ministers and senior officials from WTO member countries—including African cotton producing countries and donor governments—and international organizations.

The compilation of development assistance undertaken by the WTO Secretariat, which lists direct and indirect aid for cotton totaling \$6.85 bn was discussed. Mr Lamy described this as a tool for examining aid for cotton under the mandate and pointed out that further revision of the way it is

compiled and presented is needed.

One of the problems discussed in the meeting was the mismatch between funds that donors are making available, and the requests of the recipient countries. Mr Lamy said that participants have to dig deeper to find out why the gap exists.

Lamy calls for forging ahead with Environmental Negotiations under Doha Round

Director-General Pascal Lamy, in an address to the UNEP Global Ministerial Environment Forum in Nairobi warned that a failure of the Doha negotiations would strengthen the hand of all those who argue that economic growth should proceed unchecked without regard for the environment. He stressed that "trade, and indeed the WTO, must be made to deliver sustainable development."

He said that sustainable development is the cornerstone of globalization and the "WTO stands ready to do its part". Pursuing sustainable development was included in the Doha Round by launching the environmental negotiations, and "the world must forge ahead with these negotiations as fast as it possibly can". "Trade, and indeed the WTO, must be made to deliver sustainable development, and a sustainable development strategy, linking all international actors, must become our goal", he stressed.

Dispute Settlement

Appellate Body issues report in US — Zeroing (Japan)

The Appellate Body, in January issued its report regarding the complaint of Japan against the US in the dispute "United States: Measures Relating to Zeroing and Sunset Reviews" (WT/DS322/AB/R). The Appellate Body recommends that the DSB request the United States to bring those of its measures in the Report, found to be inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement and with the GATT 1994, into conformity with its obligations under those Agreements.

US requests for consultations in case against China on subsidies

The US, in February, requested for consultations with China with regard to certain measures granting refunds, reductions, or exemptions from taxes or payments otherwise due to the government by enterprises in China. The US dispute settlement claim lists a number of schemes that according the United States “appear to provide such refunds, reductions or exemptions to enterprises in China on the condition that those enterprises purchase domestic over imported goods, or on the condition that those enterprises meet certain export performance criteria. Accordingly, the measures appear to be inconsistent with Article 3 of the SCM Agreement”.

WTO has 150 Members

Viet Nam joined the WTO in January and became its 150th member.

Trade Policy Reviews

Trade Policy reviews for Canada, Australia, European Communities, Argentina, Japan and Chad were released in the first quarter of 2007. The Review of EC showed economic recovery driven by higher private investment and exports, lower unemployment and expanded international trade. Continued structural reforms, including further liberalization of services is needed for sustained recovery. The WTO Secretariat report for Canada showed that the trade regime remains open but some barriers persist. Australia and Japan would

require continued reforms to sustain their impressive economic growth. The review of the Argentinean economy showed strong economic recovery and pointed out that preventing market distortions would be important for sustaining growth.

WTO Publications

ILO-WTO Joint study on Trade and Employment

A study on “Trade and Employment: Challenges for Policy Research” was issued jointly by the International Labour Office and the WTO Secretariat in February. The report can be accessed at <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/eddy.pdf>

WTO 2006 Annual Report released

The WTO’s Appellate Body released its Annual Report for 2006. (http://www.wto.int/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep06_e.pdf)

WTO publishes “WTO Dispute Settlement: One-Page Case Summaries”

The WTO published the first edition of “WTO Dispute Settlement: One-Page Case Summaries”, that summarizes on a single page the core facts and findings of the panel and, where applicable, Appellate Body reports for each of the 103 cases that have been adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body during the period 1995, 1 September 2006. (http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/dispu_summary06_e.pdf)



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