

GLOBALISATION AND DEVELOPMENT AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS Martin Wolf, Chief Economics Commentator, *Financial Times*

Launch of Festschrift in honour of Montek Ahluwalia

Delhi, India

9th February 2010




"Simply stated, the bright new financial system – for all its talented participants, for all its rich rewards – failed the test of the market place." Paul Volcker, April 8th 2008

"Things that can't go on forever, don't" Herbert Stein

- I am going to ask two big questions:
 - First, what happened in this crisis?
 - Second, what does it mean for the future?


- What we have seen is a "developing country" financial crisis, but at the core of the world economy. Why?
 - 1. Undue belief in the "great moderation";
 - 2. Accommodative monetary policy aimed at targeting inflation;
 - 3. Emergence of global imbalances and extraordinary reserve accumulations in the late 1990s and early 2000s;
 - 4. Low real and nominal interest rates and a "reach for yield";
 - 5. Innovation in the financial sector, to provide notionally safe, highyielding assets; and
 - 6. Failures of commission (risk-weighted capital ratios and reliance on ratings) and omission (deregulation of securities and housing markets) in financial regulation.
- Success breeds excess and excess breeds collapse.

THE RISE OF THE IMBALANCES




CHINA RISES TO THE TOP OF THE SURPLUS LIST


CURRENT ACCOUNTS OF WORD'S THREE LARGEST SURPLUS COUNTRIES (\$bn)



THE GREAT RESERVE ACCUMULATION




US PLUNGES IN DEFICIT




FINANCIAL SECTOR DEBT EXPLOSION

SECTORAL RATIOS OF US DEBT TO GDP



- The economic collapse has been large.
- The rescue has worked.
- Yet huge problems remain.
- And fiscal and monetary firepower is largely used up in the high-income countries.


HOW PRIVATE DEFICITS COLLAPSED




RETURNING CONFIDENCE

SPREADS OF US CORPORATE BONDS OVER TREASURIES


Source: Thomson Datastream



FISCAL FIREPOWER USED




FISCAL FIREPOWER USED UP



WEAK RECOVERIES IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES


CONSENSUS FORECASTS FOR 2010

Source: Consensus Forecasts (per cent growth)



STRONG ASIAN RECOVERIES


CONSENSUS FORECASTS FOR 2010 (per cent growth)



ASIA'S CATCH UP CONTINUES

Source: IMF





- The crisis has been "resolved", by socialising the risk.
- It has also been managed by aggressive monetary and fiscal policies.
- What is needed now is a strong private-sector led recovery.
- Has enough been done to achieve this in the highincome countries, given their weak financial systems, private-sector debt overhangs, falling housing prices and need for higher savings in important economies?
- Answer: no.

- Big economic risks over the next five years:
 - Failure to restart credit expansion and crippled growth of the private sector in advanced countries;
 - Dollar and fiscal crises at the core of the world economy;
 - Surge in commodity prices, a collapse in profitability and a jump in inflation;
 - More bad lending and yet another credit crisis; and
 - Outbreak of global protection and the end of the "second globalisation".

2. What does this crisis mean?

- For capitalism?
- For globalisation?
- For development?
- For the global balance of power?
- For India?

- The crisis certainly does not mean that market economics is dead.
- But it does remind us that crises are a part of capitalism.
 - Financial fragility remains an abiding feature of decentralised market economies.
 - More specifically, the monetary and regulatory regimes adopted by high-income countries failed.
- Lessons have to be learned.
- Here are two.

- First lesson Make the financial system more robust.
- Here the options are:
 - Fixing the current system; or
 - Transforming the system.
- Under fixing the current system, the options are:
 - More capital, particularly for the biggest banks;
 - A resolution regime for banks; and
 - Movement of trading onto exchanges.

- Under transforming the current system, the options are:
 - A new division between commercial and investment banking;
 or
 - Narrow banking; or
 - Narrow banking, plus an end to credit-creating intermediation.
- At present, the effort being made is to fix the current system.
- Will this work? I doubt it.

- Second lesson inflation targeting is not enough:
 - Yes, it is hard to identify bubbles, but ignoring them is potentially catastrophic, particularly when large credit expansions go along with them;
 - These generate intense fragility in the economy;
 - Central banks should "lean against the wind";
 - They also need "macro-prudential tools", to deal with bubbles;
 and, finally,
 - Fiscal policy needs to be extremely aggressive, in the context of asset price bubbles.

2. What does this crisis mean? Globalisation

- The crisis also brings lessons for the survival of the "second globalisation".
- First lesson we still cannot handle large global imbalances:
 - Emerging and developing countries have, in aggregate, become net capital exporters;
 - This was partly to reduce risk, by accumulating reserve assets, and partly to promote export-led growth;
 - Those policies of emerging countries were a response to crises;
 - Advanced countries have proved unable to absorb these inflows;


2. What does this crisis mean? Globalisation

- Stable growth probably requires some combination of smaller surpluses and better insurance mechanisms for countries suffering "sudden stops" in capital inflow, via International Monetary Fund or similar arrangements
- Second lesson the export-oriented mercantilist strategy has hit the buffers:
 - The demand to offset growing export surpluses of continentalsized countries does not exist;
 - The big danger is of a protectionist backlash in deficit countries, especially the US;
 - If unemployment does not fall soon, these dangers are very great.

- The crisis also has positive and negative lessons for development.
- First lesson countries with sizeable reserves and the ability to expand domestic demand have survived well.
 This is notably true for China and India.
- Second lesson capital flows remain unstable. But some capital flows are much more unstable than others. Direct investment is recovering quickly.
- Third lesson high trade ratios can be a benefit even in a global crisis. The explanation is that, at the margin, trade is then less vital.


COMMERCIAL BANK LOANS UNSTABLE AGAIN

EXTERNAL FINANCING OF EMERGING ECONOMIES (\$bn)




COMMERCIAL BANKS LOANS UNSTABLE AGAIN

EXTERNAL FINANCE OF EMERGING ECONOMIES (\$bn)



RISING OPENNESS OF BOTH GIANTS




2. What does this crisis mean? Power

- The failure of the western financial system and the global recession have undermined western credibility and prestige.
- Meanwhile, China and India have come into their own.
- The rise of the G20 and eclipse of the G7 is proof of this shift.

2. What does this crisis mean? Power

GROUP OF SEVEN FALLING


SHARES OF G7 COUNTRIES IN WORLD GDP (at PPP)



2. What does this crisis mean? Power

CHINA AND INDIA RISING

SHARES OF "BRIC" COUNTRIES IN WORLD GDP (at PPP)



2. What does this crisis mean? India

- So what are the conclusion that India needs to draw from this crisis for its development and its engagement with the world economy?
- I would suggest the following ten lessons:
 - Lesson one: what India has been doing has worked. It should do more of it!
 - Lesson two: sustaining an open world economy may prove hard. India should do what it can to help.
 - Lesson three: openness to trade has not caused excessive vulnerability to global instability, notwithstanding the critics.

2. What does this crisis mean? India

- Lesson four: global capital markets are indeed unstable, particularly short-term credit flows and, above all, bank credit. It is right for a developing country to protect itself against this instability.
- Lesson five: for this reason, large holdings of foreign currency reserves have proved sensible. But China's \$2.5trn is excessive!
- Lesson six: it is wise to curb India's vulnerability to "sudden stops" in capital inflows, especially credit inflows, by limiting inflows of such capital.

2. What does this crisis mean? India

- Lesson seven: it is wise to prevent large domestic asset and credit bubbles.
- Lesson eight: India will need fiscal room for manoeuvre. For this reason, the debt ratio needs to be lowered as soon as possible.
- Lesson nine: India needs to focus on developing its domestic economy. Many reforms are needed here.
- Lesson ten: Expect the unexpected. Flexibility is essential, in both the economy and policy-making.