POLICY BRIEF #24

Why INSTC is More Important than Ever for India

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Abstract

The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) has emerged as a crucial alternative route for global trade in the context of recent geopolitical disruptions. With shipping lines through the Red Sea facing rising risk of attacks related to the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict and the Suez Canal being prone to blockages, the INSTC offers a more efficient and cost-effective alternative for transporting goods between India, Russia, and the Central Asian countries. This policy brief examines India's export potential to the INSTC member countries, emphasizing the untapped export opportunities that could be instrumental in achieving India's ambitious target of reaching US$ 2 trillion in exports by 2030. The policy brief also highlights the challenges in fully operationalizing the corridor, including the need for improved inter-modal transfers, enhanced banking and insurance services, and stronger hinterland connectivity. Addressing these challenges and leveraging the INSTC's potential could significantly expand India's trade in the region.

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Why INSTC is More Important than Ever for India

Nisha Taneja, Sanjana Joshi, Sanya Dua and Alina Siddiqui

1. Introduction

The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), is a multi-modal transportation network that was initiated by an Inter-Governmental Agreement by India, Russia, and Iran on 12th September 2000, to enhance trade and transport connectivity among the countries along its route. The corridor connects the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea via Iran, and then Russia to Northern Europe via connects St. Petersburg. The INSTC membership was expanded subsequently and now has 13 members, namely- India, Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Belarus, Oman and Syria. Bulgaria has joined as an 'Observer State'.

This regional connectivity initiative has been under discussion for a long time; however, progress was slow due to geopolitics and implementation has been intermittent. The INSTC is once again in focus due to geopolitics – primarily the US led sanctions on Russia in the context of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the shipping attacks in the Red Sea amidst the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict. Earlier in 2021, one of the largest container ships, the "Ever Given", became lodged in the Suez Canal for six days, causing disruptions and heavy losses in maritime trade. The blockage left over 300 vessels waiting resulting in huge transaction costs for shipping companies.

These incidents have created an urgency for looking at alternative routes. India therefore has renewed interest in the INSTC and sees two distinct advantages in operationalising this route:

First, it offers an alternative to the Suez Canal route and;

Second, it provides India an opportunity to exploit the untapped export potential that exists in the INSTC member countries, especially the Central Asian countries.

We examine here the nature of the Red Sea crisis, the advantage of INSTC as an alternative transportation route, and estimate the export potential that India has with the INSTC member countries. We also identify the challenges that India is likely to face and suggest how these can be addressed.

2. Red Sea Attacks and Shipping Disruptions

The Red Sea wedged between Africa and the Middle East is one of the world's most important waterways. The Red Sea is defined by two narrow waterways: to the north, the Suez Canal; and to the south, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. In 2023, 22 percent of global seaborne container trade is estimated to have transited through the Suez Canal.[1] However, since November 2023,

[1] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2024)

the Houthi rebel group in Yemen has targeted commercial vessels with connections to Israel passing through the strait of Bab al-Mandab, a 20-mile-wide channel that separates north-east Africa from Yemen.

Since November 2023, there have been a total of 105 attacks on commercial ships crossing the Red Sea. The number of attacks in June 2024 was 21, highest since the Israel-Hamas conflict began in October 2023.

Figure 1: Number of Commercial Ships Attacked in the Red Sea



Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED)

By the end of March 2024, the volume of trade through the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb Strait had decreased by 50 percent since December 2023, while traffic on the alternative route via the Cape of Good Hope had increased by 100 percent.[2]

Figure 2: Number of cargo ships transiting via the Suez Canal & the Cape of Good Hope



Source: portwatch.imf.org

[2] Bogetic, Zhao, Le Borgne, and Krambeck (2024)

However, the routing of ships via the Cape of Good Hope has meant substantial increase in the transportation costs. Several insurance companies have also majorly increased the premiums for the ships sailing in the Red Sea.

3. INSTC: An Alternative Route

From India's perspective, the INSTC presents a viable alternative to the conventional routes to the Eurasian region. The transport of goods between India, the Russian Federation, and CIS countries mostly takes place via the sea route passing through the Suez Canal to access either port Novorossiysk in the Black Sea basin or the Baltic Sea port of St. Petersburg.[3] In the case of several central Asian countries the goods usually take the sea route to China and then move inland.[4] In comparison, the INSTC is shorter and cost-effective. Studies suggest that while the Suez Canal route takes 45-60 days the INSTC is 40 per cent shorter and 30 per cent cheaper.[5]

Figure 3: INSTC route & traditional route through the Suez Canal

Source: Indicative plotting by authors using Datawrapper

[3] Shinde, S. (2021). *Dry run study on Chabahar agreement with TIR intermodal*. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, & Federation of Freight Forwarders Association in India. Available at https://www.fffai.org

[4] Ibid

[5] Ibid

Several steps have been taken by Members to operationalise the INSTC route but challenges remain. India became a member of the TIR Convention (Convention on International Transport of Goods Under Cover of TIR Carnets) in 2018, which facilitates seamless transportation of cargo across multiple international boundaries under a single document. The TIR system is one of the most successful international transport conventions and is the easiest, safest, and most reliable way to move goods across multiple international borders. In fact, India became a signatory to the Convention in 2017 much after the other countries so that it could align with all the other countries in the INSTC.[6]

While the TIR convention membership lays down a sound foundation for seamless transportation, efficient inter-modal transfer is important for the success of multi-modal cargo transport systems like the INSTC. A key challenge in multimodal transport is the coordination and management of the supply chain. Issues can arise when transferring cargo between different transportation modes, such as road, rail, and maritime routes within the INSTC framework. Any delays or inefficiencies in these transfers can result in higher costs, increased logistical complexities, and potential disruptions to supply chains.

The Chabahar Port in Iran is a key node that connects all Members of the INSTC and is perhaps more important than the Bandar Abbas Port (the original Iranian Port that was part of the INSTC) as it serves as a key access point to the eastern and western flanks of the corridor. Chabahar is also closer to India than Bandar Abbas Port and can provide more direct and cost-effective access to Central Asian countries via Afghanistan. Although Afghanistan is not part of the INSTC, it has acceded to the TIR convention. In a more recent development, in May 2024, India and Iran signed a 10-year agreement for the management and development of the Chabahar Port in south-eastern Iran towards the advancement of the INSTC.

On the eastern flank the proposed Chabahar-Zahedan railway line connecting Chabahar Port to Zahedan in south-eastern Iran near the Iran-Afghanistan border is a vital link that will facilitate transport connectivity from Chabahar Port to Afghanistan and the INSTC countries beyond. Although an MoU was signed between Indian Railway Construction International Limited (IRCON) and Iran's Railways' Construction and Development of Transportation Infrastructures Company (CDTIC) in 2016, the 700-km Chabahar-Zahedan railway line has not made much progress.

On the western flank, the Rasht–Astara railway connecting Rasht in Iran with Astara in Azerbaijan is expected to reduce the cargo travel time between St Petersburg and Mumbai to around 10 days, compared to the current 30 to 45 days via the sea route. The construction of the 162 km railway line was agreed upon by Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia in 2005 to seamlessly link the existing railway networks of the three countries. However, the project has been stalled for years due to financial and engineering issues as well as tensions between Azerbaijan and Iran. Last year in May Russia agreed to fund this railway line as part of the

[6] United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (n.d.)

INSTC with an investment of 1.6 billion euros. It was envisaged that the line would be completed in 48 months.[7] However, according to media reports, the contract for the implementation of the agreement is yet to be finalized.[8]

The importance of Chabahar Port has grown further as it enjoys a waiver from international sanctions that have been imposed on several economic sectors in Iran. It is in the interest of all members to include Chabahar Port as part of the INSTC. In fact, India's proposal to include Chabahar Port within the framework of INSTC was included in the India-Central Asia Summit Joint Declaration in January 2022.[9] The Central Asian countries also welcomed India's proposal to establish a Joint Working Group on Chabahar Port to "address issues of free movement of goods and services between India and Central Asian countries".[10] India again reiterated the importance of including the Chabahar Port within the framework of the INSTC in March 2023, at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit.

Another major development is the agreement between Russian Railways (RZD) and Container Corporation of India (CONCOR), aimed at jointly developing multi-modal logistics services integrating rail and sea routes along the INSTC. Recently, in June 2024, Russia sent two trains loaded with coal to India via the INSTC, marking a significant milestone in operationalizing the agreement.

Even though Chabahar port is waived from international sanctions, a complex banking issue has emerged as these sanctions on Iran do not permit it to transact through the SWIFT electronic banking network. This affects the logistic service providers who cannot settle their payments as foreign banks are often unwilling to handle the service payments. As a result, the majority of INSTC payment transactions are routed via UAE due to remittance challenges.[11]

Further, as the sanctions include a ban on the provision of insurance to the State of Iran and Iranian owned companies, the international insurance service providers do not participate in the INSTC sector. At times, some are willing to provide insurance up to the port but do not cover on-carriage/haulage in transit cargo.

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7 "Iran, Russia ink agreement for construction of Rasht-Astara railway", May 17, 2023. https://president.ir/en/143976

8 Tehran Times. (April 16, 2024). *Iran, Russia finalizing agreement for constructing Rasht-Astara railway*. https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/497208/Iran-Russia-finalizing-agreement-for-constructing-Rasht-Astara

9 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (January 27, 2022). *Delhi Declaration of the 1st India-Central Asia Summit*. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/34773/Delhi_Declaration_of_the_1st_IndiaCentral_Asia_Summit

10 Ibid.

11 Shinde, S. (2021). *Dry run study on Chabahar agreement with TIR intermodal*. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, & Federation of Freight Forwarders Association in India. Available at https://www.fffai.org

4. India's Export Potential in INSTC Member Countries

India's Foreign Trade Policy (FTP) 2023 aims to boost India's exports to US$ 2 trillion by 2030. In this context, to calculate India's export potential to INSTC member countries, we have identified products where India is competitive in exporting to the World and INSTC countries also import these from the world – implying that there is export capacity available in India and a demand for that product in INSTC countries.[12] To further identify exportable products in which India is globally competitive, we follow the methodology proposed by Bela Balassa (1965) and select those items in which India has a Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) greater than unity.[13] Untapped trade potential for any commodity is given by Min (SE, MI) - ET where SE, MI, and ET are the supplier's global exports, receiver's global imports, and existing trade between the supplier and the receiver, respectively.

India's exports to INSTC member countries totalled US$ 20 billion in 2022. We estimate the export potential to be US$ 180 billion which is nine times higher than the current exports. Our analysis reveals that the top five countries with high export potential are Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Oman.

Figure 4: India's Potential to Export to INSTC Member Countries

Source: WITS (Indicative plotting by authors using Datawrapper)

[12] The formula for calculating India's export potential to INSTC member country is: Trade Potential= Minimum of (value of India's trade with the World, value of INSTC country's trade with the World) – (Bilateral Trade between India and INSTC country). The formula is applied to each INSTC country separately. Applying the above to calculate India's export potential to INSTC country at a disaggregated product level (HS 6-digit): Export Potential= Minimum of (India X, i, W, INSTC country M, i, W) – (India X, i, INSTC); where, India X, i, W = value of India's exports of product 'i' to the World; INSTC country, M, i, W = value of INSTC country's imports of product 'i' from the World; India X, i, INSTC = value of India's exports of product 'i' to INSTC country; X = Exports; M=Imports

[13] RCA is computed using the following formula: RCAij = (Xij / XI) / (Xwj / XW) where, Xij represents country i's export of commodity j, Xwj represents world exports of commodity j, XI represents the total exports of country I, and XW represents total world exports.

India's current exports to Turkey stand at US$ 10 billion, and the potential export value is estimated at US$ 68.6 billion, indicating a huge untapped potential. Russia also presents a substantial opportunity, with current exports of US $2.9 billion and a potential of US$ 50 billion.[14] Similarly, in 2022, India's exports to Kazakhstan amounted to US$ 437 million, while the estimated export potential is valued at US$ 12.5 billion. (Figure 5)

Figure 5: India's Exports to INSTC Member Countries (2022) and India's Export Potential (Values in US$Mn)



Source: WITS

At the sectoral level, the top 5 products with the highest export potential are mineral products, chemical products, machinery and electrical equipment, base metal products, and textiles accounting for 73.6 percent of potential exports while current exports of these items accounted for 70.2 percent of total exports in 2022. Thus, items with the highest export potential are also the largest items being traded currently (Table 1).

[14] For sectoral country-wise exports in 2022 see Appendix 1

Table 1: India's Current Exports and Export Potential with INSTC Members

Sector description	Total Sector-wise Exports to INSTC member countries in 2022 (in US$ Million)	Share in India's Total Exports in 2022 (%)	Total Sector-wise Potential to INSTC member countries (in US$ Million)	Share in India's Export Potential (%)
Mineral products	5893	28.7	39237	21.8
Chemical & allied products	3131	15.3	31343	17.4
Machinery and electrical equipment	2118	10.3	29593	16.4
Base metals products	2188	10.7	18923	10.5
Textiles	1068	5.2	13494	7.5
Transport equipment	1121	5.5	12261	6.8
Vegetable Products	2230	10.9	10546	5.9
Plastics, Rubber	483	2.4	7377	4.1
Prepared foodstuffs & beverages	719	3.5	4933	2.7
Articles of stone; glass and glassware	310	1.5	2149	1.2
Gems & Jewellery	360	1.8	1990	1.1
Pulp products, Paper	134	0.7	1937	1.1
Animal Products	303	1.5	1483	0.8
Skins & leather articles	44	0.2	1078	0.6
Optical, Measuring instruments	223	1.1	945	0.5
Others	201	1.0	2976	1.7
Grand Total	**20527**	**100.0**	**180264**	**100.0**

Source: WITS

However, at the sectoral level, the export potential varies across INSTC members. Mineral products have a high export potential in several of the INSTC members which include -Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Oman, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kyrgyzstan. With other countries, India has a large export potential in one or two items- chemical products to Russia and Belarus; base metals to Turkey; machinery and electrical equipment to Russia and Kazakhstan; prepared foodstuffs & beverages to Iran; and vegetable products to Syria and Tajikistan (Table 2).

The export potential can only be realized if market access issues are addressed, particularly those related to product standards. For instance, India has raised concerns about non-tariff barriers affecting its exports to Russia, especially in marine and pharmaceutical products. Indian exporters face challenges with certification and listing requirements when exporting to Russia[15].

Similarly, Turkey has the largest trade potential of US$ 68.6 billion but has stringent requirements for food, feed, and pharmaceuticals. The Biosafety Law mandates 20-year traceability records for animal feed products using biotechnology. In case of pharmaceuticals, Turkey's regulation requires Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) certification through inspections by Turkish authorities. It has been reported that the backlog in inspections has extended the already lengthy process of securing final approval for pharmaceutical products to be sold in Turkey. [16] Addressing these barriers will be crucial for Indian exporters to be able to access these markets.

[15] Nandi (2024)
[16] Office of the United States Trade Representative. (2024)

Table 2: Sector-wise share of India's total exports in 2022 and export potential to INSTC countries (%)

Sector-wise share of India's Total Export Potential to INSTC countries (%)												
Sector description	**Turkey**	**Russia**	**Ukraine**	**Kazakhstan**	**Oman**	**Belarus**	**Iran**	**Armenia**	**Azerbaijan**	**Kyrgyz**	**Syria**	**Tajikistan**
Mineral Products	24.7	4.1	49.6	9.2	81.5	1.1	2.3	21.3	40.6	75.6	17.6	9.1
Base metals	18.4	5.9	3.2	12.0		7.8	6.7	7.5				
Machinery and electrical equipment	13.2	23.5	10.5	25.1		22.5	21.5	17.2				
Chemicals	11.5	30.1	15.6	16.0	6.7	17.6	16.6	7.6	6.1	2.1	2.9	12.7
Transport equipment	8.5	7.1	1.8	5.1		13.5	11.3	1.9				
Textiles	7.9	8.8	5.3	8.7		11.0	7.9	6.5				
Vegetable Products	5.0	4.4	3.1	4.8	8.5	0.9	15.8	8.1	37.8	12.1	65.1	72.6
Plastics and rubber	3.3	5.0	4.3	6.0		9.3	3.0	2.8				
Prepared foodstuffs and beverages	2.2	2.1	2.4	4.6	2.5	0.6	9.2	3.5	13.5	9.6	12.7	2.6
Gems and Jewellery	1.6	0.6	0.1	1.0		0.2	0.1	15.6				
Articles of stone, etc	1.1	0.9	0.9	1.2		2.0	2.1	2.0				
Skin and Leather articles	0.8	1.4	1.0	3.1		1.7	1.4	3.4				
Pulp products, paper	0.4	1.3	0.3	0.7		0.4	0.0	0.4				
Optical, measuring instruments	0.3	0.5	0.2	0.5		4.0	0.5	0.4				
Animals and Animal Products	0.2	2.1	0.6	0.3	0.6	0.3	0.1	0.7	1.5	0.1	0.4	2.8
Others	0.8	2.3	1.2	1.8	0.1	7.2	1.5	1.1	0.4	0.5	1.2	0.2
Grand Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
Total Potential (US $ million)	**68601**	**9024**	**50048**	**5797**	**12502**	**18383**	**856**	**1763**	**479**	**2808**	**1202**	**8799**

Source: WITS

5. Full Operationalisation of INSTC: Way Forward

To make the INSTC fully operational the following steps are needed:

i. Banking and insurance facilities

In the context of the payments issue, a clear public notice from the US that goods only transiting through Chabahar Port are exempt from sanctions would encourage foreign banks to handle the trade and services payments. As international insurance companies are also reluctant to participate in this corridor, the national insurance companies should participate in providing these services without additional premiums and restriction clause limitation.

ii. Efficient inter-modal transfers

While the TIR Convention permits all INSTC members to trade seamlessly under a single document, efficient systems would be needed to reap full benefits. Cargo handling and procedures need to be made simple and automated so that time taken for movement of cargo is minimised. With multiple stakeholders and transport modes involved, establishing effective communication and synchronization of transport schedules is required.

iii. Strengthening hinterland connectivity

The missing transport links particularly the Rasht–Astara railway connecting Rasht in Iran with Astara in Azerbaijan and the Chabahar-Zahedan railway line connecting Chabahar Port to Zahedan in south-eastern Iran near the Iran-Afghanistan border are vital links that need to be expedited. A framework needs to be prepared by INSTC Members to develop a financing mechanism that would address the financing needs of the infrastructure projects that are crucial to the success of the working of the INSTC.

iv. Realising export potential

There needs to be a greater awareness of trade opportunities amongst members of the INSTC. Also, non-tariff barriers need to be identified and addressed on a continuous basis. Information on product standards and other regulatory requirements needs to be shared between countries so that market access issues can be addressed effectively.

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Appendix

Appendix 1

Table A.1: Sector-wise share of India's total exports to INSTC countries in 2022 (%)

Sector description	Turkey	Russia	Ukraine	Kazakhstan	Oman	Belarus	Iran	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Kyrgyz	Syria	Tajikistan
Mineral Products	35.5	0.5	1.0	0.1	49.0	0.0	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0
Base metals	15.1	8.1	5.9	1.0	8.6	3.4	0.5	0.7	1.4	0.3	4.2	0.2
Chemicals	11.2	35.1	56.0	20.0	10.2	64.4	10.7	5.5	12.1	38.2	16.8	54.5
Machinery and electrical equipment	9.9	15.4	6.9	63.8	6.2	6.6	2.3	23.9	31.5	1.6	3.0	7.8
Textiles	7.9	2.5	1.3	0.2	3.0	3.3	1.4	13.9	0.8	42.1	4.9	0.6
Transport equipment	6.9	1.9	1.9	2.2	7.5	0.4	0.3	0.6	0.8	2.6	0.8	0.0
Gems and Jewellery	3.3	0.5	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	17.8	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
Plastics and rubber	2.5	4.0	6.3	0.7	1.7	3.1	0.6	0.8	1.8	0.4	1.0	0.3
Prepared foodstuffs	2.4	6.7	5.1	0.5	1.3	1.2	5.6	18.0	25.8	3.6	52.4	30.7
Vegetable Products	1.6	11.5	6.6	4.9	6.2	2.4	74.8	3.5	6.5	3.9	14.9	1.9
Articles of stone, etc	1.0	2.7	1.4	2.0	1.9	0.5	0.6	3.6	12.5	1.6	0.1	1.7
Optical, cinematographic, etc. instruments	1.0	2.3	2.6	3.2	0.5	3.4	0.6	1.9	2.1	1.4	0.4	1.2
Pulp products, paper	0.8	0.3	2.0	0.1	0.7	0.1	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.1	0.0	0.7
Leather articles	0.2	0.8	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1	1.2	0.0	0.0
Animals and Animal Products	0.1	5.4	1.7	0.7	2.2	9.7	0.9	8.9	2.8	1.8	0.0	0.0
Others	0.7	2.2	1.2	0.4	0.8	1.4	1.0	0.1	1.0	1.1	1.4	0.3
India's total exports (%)	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
India's total exports (US$ bn)	**10014**	**4721**	**2927**	**1840**	**437**	**202**	**109**	**86**	**51**	**51**	**48**	**43**

Appendix 2

Table A.2.1: India's top 10 Sector-wise Potential with INSTC Countries (Values in US$ Mn)

HS 6-digit	Product Description	Turkey	Russia	Iran	Kazakhstan	Ukraine	Kyrgyzstan
271019	Petroleum oils; not light oils and preparations	14841	1344	78	738	7029	515
760110	Aluminium; unwrought, (not alloyed)	3063					
870322	Vehicles; cylinder capacity over 1000 but not over 1500cc	2780	1303				
100199	Cereals	2106		639	260		68
851712	Telephones for cellular networks or for other wireless networks	1738	4398		832	675	
760120	Aluminium; unwrought, alloys	1547					
300490	Medicaments; for therapeutic or prophylactic uses	1477	7336	168	926	1067	
520100	Cotton; not carded or combed	1204					
870321	Vehicles; cylinder capacity not over 1000cc	969					
720839	Iron or non-alloy steel; in coils	914					
271012	Petroleum oils; light oils and preparations					1627	362
380893	Herbicides, anti-sprouting products and plant-growth regulators				195	472	
380892	Fungicides; put up in forms or packings for retail sale					294	
621143	Track suits;women's or girls', of man-made fibres					255	
401120	Rubber; new pneumatic tyres, of a kind used on buses or lorries		622			178	
270400	Coke and semi-coke				263	174	
80390	Fruit, edible; bananas, other than plantains, fresh or dried					155	19
850231	Electric generating sets				221		
270119	Coal; (other than anthracite and bituminous)						19
90111	Coffee; not roasted or decaffeinated		543				
841480	Pumps and compressors			124	200		
80610	Fruit, edible; grapes, fresh						8
848340	Gears and gearing			165			
870899	Vehicle parts and accessories; n.e.c. in heading no. 8708		851	400			
90240	Tea, black; (fermented) and partly fermented tea			113			
190531	Food preparations; sweet biscuits, whether or not containing cocoa						19
843149	Machinery; parts of machines handling earth		655				
871120	Motorcycles (including mopeds) and cycles			104			
20230	Meat; of bovine animals, boneless cuts, frozen		517				

720711	Iron or non-alloy steel				208		
170199	Sugars; sucrose, chemically pure, in solid form				207		51
871410	Motorcycles (including mopeds); parts and accessories			85			
110100	Wheat or meslin flour						14
281820	Aluminium oxide; other than artificial corundum		679				
170114	Sugars; cane sugar, raw, in solid form			370			27

*Highlighted numbers indicate the item with largest potential trade

Table A.2.2: India's top 10 Sector-wise Potential with INSTC Countries (Values in US$ Mn)

HS 6-digit	Product Description	Oman	Syria	Azerbaijan	Tajikistan	Armenia	Belarus
271012	Petroleum oils; light oils and preparations	6391	82	369		206	
260112	Iron ores and concentrates	543					
100199	Cereals	300	27	433	307	101	
290919	Ethers	285					
271119	Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied	239	26				
281820	Aluminium oxide; other than artificial corundum	153		53	52		
100630	Cereals; rice, semi-milled or wholly milled	108	53	39	7		
190531	Food preparations; sweet biscuits, whether or not containing cocoa	65		35	5		
271312	Petroleum coke; calcined, obtained from bituminous minerals	57					
170199	Sugars; sucrose, chemically pure, in solid form	50	52				
271019	Petroleum oils; not light oils and preparations		32	324	35	368	73
760110	Aluminium; unwrought, (not alloyed)					62	
870322	Vehicles; cylinder capacity over 1000 but not over 1500cc						309
851712	Telephones for cellular networks or for other wireless networks					303	97
760120	Aluminium; unwrought, alloys						
300490	Medicaments; for therapeutic or prophylactic uses					123	322
80390	Fruit, edible; bananas, other than plantains, fresh or dried			37			
90111	Coffee; not roasted or decaffeinated		33			39	
600622	Fabrics; knitted or crocheted fabric						110
90240	Tea, black; (fermented) and partly fermented tea			62	4		
701090	Glass; carboys, bottles, flasks, jars, pots					41	
81090	Fruit, edible; fruits n.e.c. in heading no. 0801 to 0810, fresh		58				

70190	Vegetables; potatoes (other than seed), fresh or chilled			42			
840890	Engines; other than marine propulsion or the vehicles of chapter 87						108
20230	Meat; of bovine animals, boneless cuts, frozen				13		
270810	Pitch; obtained from coal tar or from other mineral tars				4		
110100	Wheat or meslin flour		201		21		
710231	Diamonds; non-industrial, unworked					142	
170114	Sugars; cane sugar, raw, in solid form			175			
710239	Diamonds; non-industrial					241	
71320	Vegetables, leguminous		43				
230610	Oil-cake and other solid residues				4		
870323	Vehicles; cylinder capacity over 1500 but not over 3000cc						168
999999	Commodities not specified according to kind						159
600410	Fabrics; knitted or crocheted fabrics of a width exceeding 30 cm						101
870331	Vehicles; cylinder capacity not over 1500cc						100

*Highlighted numbers indicate the item with largest potential trade

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