### Future of Indian Financial Liberalization

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
Opportunities for Global Partnership between India and Japan
-Infrastructure, the Environment, and Finance
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
### Financial Reform: India's choices

- > Pre reform: Financial repression
  - ★ Administered interest rates
    - Controls; funds for Government
- > Post reform:Liberalization
  - ★ Institutional and market development: Banks; BSE, NSE; demat
  - ★ Interest rates market determined: LAF; CCIL; RTGS; money markets
- > Financial regulation
  - \* RBI; SEBI; IRDA; PFRDA; HLCCFM
- Current account convertibility
  - ☆ Capital account: Gradual; order: equity over debt; long-term borrowing
  - ★ FDI, FPI, GDRs, ECBs, FIIs limits for G-secs
- > Exchange rate: Double devaluation
  - ★ Market determined; managed but flexible; FX markets
  - ★ REER; two-way movement since 2003; FERA to FEMA














### Liberalization: Consequences

- > Trend growth rose but so did volatility
- > FDI stable
  - \* Reduces supply-side bottlenecks; learning, better organization
  - ★ Smoothen process, reduce hurdles
- > FPI: Volatile, drove equity market volatility
  - ★ Risk sharing (inflows 3 times larger than outflows for equivalent market indices variation)
    - Resumed soon: Indian growth prospects
    - Firms benefited easier fund access; also learning
    - But households exited equity markets
- > Reserves
  - ☆ Over US200b but CAD; self-insurance but cost
- > Sovereign debt held internally
  - ★ Large: 80 percent of GDP; limits on debt inflows; no Greece?



### Crises lessons

- Capital flows: Surges and sudden stops
  - ★ Self-insurance, reserves
    - Exchange rate flexibility; FX markets; hedging instruments
- Foreign entry helps but alone does not deepen markets
  - ★ Example retail exit in equity markets
  - ★ New private banks but still large unbanked population
- Transparent sequenced capital account convertibility
  - ★ Distinction between types of flows is useful and must be retained
  - ★ Korea: Reserves security led to high short-term debt, reserves proved inadequate
  - \*Domestic growth, financial deepening→ absorption, FDI ratio; real sector priority
- ➤ NIFA; G:20; regional arrangements: to allow faster liberalization?
- > Structure of regulation
  - ☆ Global convergence; incentives
- > Package: CAL, E and M policy, markets: middling through



# Future of Financial Liberalization: Critical development imperatives

- > Inclusion
- > Infrastructure financing
  - ★ Long-term: Bond markets: Retail, pension funds participation
  - \* Rollover of ST financing; exit of investors; completing markets
- > Risk: Derivative markets
  - ☆ OTC regulated in India but more transparency, CCP
  - ★ Standardized exchange traded instruments



### Banks

- Less than 50 percent of the population have bank accounts
  - \* Expansion of banking services, not just credit
- ➤ Use of technology; mobile banking; BCs; MSPs
  - ★Mobile penetration high; last mile connectivity
  - \* Requirements: 100m migrants, remittances
- > Servicing large corporates (5-7% roi); MSEs (9-11.25%)
  - ★Entry; mergers but competition, TBTF; loan consortium, LT ECBs
  - ☆Credit bureaus, SARFAESI Act 2002 (used against MSEs)



### Markets

- > Equity markets
  - \* Retail and institutional investor participation
  - ★ GDS/GDP crossed 30 %: large scope from domestic entry
    - ♦ But share of household financial savings in equity dipped from 20% pre-reform to 5%
  - ★ 90% trading volume in top 10 cities, and in equity and commodities
    - ♦ Only 1.5% of population invested in markets
    - ♦ Only 100 large cap stocks liquid
    - AMFs, ETFs, MSEs, single stock options, underperforming
- > Fixed income markets
  - ★ Domestic deepening prior to free foreign entry
    - ♦ Banks to push G-secs retail? Allow SLR to fall; more trading
  - ☆ Corporate bond market
    - Stamp duty; cost of issuing: private placement
    - Pension provident fund guidelines on the basis of rating not issuers category



### Markets contd.

- ➤ Debt markets contd.
  - **☆**Interest rate futures
    - ♦ Attempts: 2003, 2009; ZCYC to YTM
    - ♦ Globally 81% of exchange traded derivatives, India 1%
    - Physical settlement
    - Corporate repo would provide users
    - ♦ Initially only two long-term deliverable G secs; lack of liquidity in underlying
- > FX markets
  - ☆ OTC dominates, swaps
  - ★ BIS fastest growth rate among world markets but still thin; if no intervention spikes
  - ★ Futures, rapid growth
    - ♦ Low Open Interest
    - Not settled in hard currency
    - **♦ Low contract size: USD 1000**
  - ☆ Continuous devt.: Multiple currencies, options



- Creation of electronic markets: Exceeding international standards
  - → Disclosure: real time price sensitive info; norms; corporate governance; legal issues; shareholder rights
  - ★ Volatility: Var + SPAN+ margins +deposits+ circuit breakers +surveillance
    - ♦ No stock exchange failed
  - ☆ Competition: liquidity → network → tipping
    - $\diamond$  BSE  $\rightarrow$  NSE
    - ♦ Entry: MCX, NSE → predatory pricing? platforms, lock-in



### Asian integration

- > Regional financial integration low
  - ★ Although intraregional trade more than 50% of total trade
  - ☆Collapse of trade in 2008 partly due to credit freeze
  - ★Alternatives to Western markets, currencies and institutions; more stable; AMF

#### > ABMI

- ★ Large Asian savings to fund Asian infrastructure; stable long-term finance
- \* Regional clearing and settlement systems

#### > CMI

- ★ Supporting institutions; expansion; review; prevent competitive devaluations
- > CSR
  - **★** Environment
  - ★ Commitment to regional development
- > Incentives from high expected Asian growth and trade expansion



# Post Crisis: Market and Regulatory Failures

- > Market efficiency implies (no failures):
  - ★ Market prices give economic value
  - ★ Market discipline constrains harmful risk taking
  - ★ Market competition weeds out unproductive innovations
    - Securitised credit: liquidity, diversification
    - Mathematical models: robust measures of trading risk



#### Market failure

- ★ Monopoly or market power
- ★ Asymmetric or imperfect information
- ★ Externalities or public goods
- > Financial system: Oversight of operational framework
  - ★ Externality—excess volatility: one → others, financial → real
  - ★ Information— asymmetric; adverse selection, moral hazard
  - ★ Monopoly— network effects; TBTF → risk taking



#### Government



#### Markets

Regulation: Principle-based rules
Change incentives of agents
Regional standardization, operational freedom



Basic market failures

- Broad justification for regulation
  - ★ Pendulum: neither self-regulation nor regulatory forbearance
  - ★ Use incentives not controls: So don't damp energy and freedom of markets



# Future Financial Reform: Stability

- ➤ Indian markets → Global norms → Indian regulations
  - ★ Micro-prudential regulation → securitization retention; PCA
  - ★ Macro-prudential regulation → procyclical capital adequacy
    - Reduce under pricing of risk in booms
    - ♦ Reduce S-T Funding; excess leverage
    - $\diamond$ Size (TBTF)  $\rightarrow$  insurance premium
    - → Imposed by host country (domestic cycles)
- ➤ Universal standards ⇒ ↓ regulatory arbitrage; ↓ Competitive risk-taking
- ➤ Would allow faster liberalization



# Indian regulation

- Crisis—financial sector healthy
  - ★ No road, or good regulation?
  - ★ Eye on market failures, steady market development but innovation slow
- Supervision
  - ★ Post liberalization crises → strengthened
  - ☆ Conglomerates → universal regulation
- > Counter cyclical incentives prescient
  - ☆ Provisioning
  - ★ Accounting standards—unrealized gains and losses asymmetric
  - → PCA
- ➤ Low cost of Basel III compliance
  - ★ Banks tier I capital to risk weighted assets 9.3 already
  - ☆ Credit GDP to rise structurally; cost of OTC derivatives to rise; SLR not a liquidity buffer?



- >Financial stability
  - ★ Synergy between monetary policy and regulatory responsibilities
  - ★ LOLR required by many non-bank entities also
- >FSDC should be improved HLCCFM
  - ☆Improved coordination most important; lacking in govt. agencies
  - ☆Chair macroprudential regulator with hands on knowledge
    - ♦ Delays: Corporate Repo Market: CCIL; ownership
    - Functional regulation: overlap inevitable; clear responsibility allocation
  - ★Legal structure; development mandated
    - **♦ Timelines**

# Thank you

