
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#### LAW & PROJECT FINANCE

#### KRISHNAMURTHY SUBRAMANIAN INDIAN SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

Joint with F R E D E R I C K T U N G Chair Professor of Law, Boston University, USA

Seminar at ICRIER, Aug 2010



### The Law, Economics & Finance literature

- Law and Finance literature (LLSV 1997,98 & others)
  - Analyzes effect of "legal" investor protection on various country-level outcomes

This literature is international in its perspectiveUnlike a majority of the other literature in Finance

Directly relevant for India & emerging countries

### The Law, Economics & Finance literature

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□LLSV (1997, 1998) started from the following proposition:

Legal protection of outside investors (shareholders and creditors):

- Limits the extent of expropriation of such investors
- by corporate insiders, and
- thereby promotes economic and financial development

□Much stronger legal protection of investors (and enforcement) in some countries than others

- Such differences related to the legal origins (English common law vs. French or German Civil law)
- English common law countries generally better

# Pervasive influence on economic & financial outcomes

- Government ownership of banks (La Porta et al. 2002)
- Burden of entry regulations (Djankov et al. 2002)
- Regulation of labor markets (Juan C. Botero et al. 2004)
- Incidence of military conscription (Casey B. Mulligan and Shleifer 2005a, 2005b)
- Government ownership of the media (Djankov et al. 2003a)


#### Legal protection & Finance OUTCOME




#### Challenges in empirical work

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□Inferring causal effects of any legal/ institutional variable on a particular outcome is challenging





#### Agenda

Broad overview of Research in "Law, Economics and Finance"

Law and Project Finance: Motivation and Introduction

Law and Project Finance: Data and Proxies

Law and Project Finance: Empirical Results

Law and Project Finance: Summary and Conclusion

#### Motivation

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#### □ Rapid growth in use of Project finance

From < \$10 billion per year in late 1980s to almost \$500 billion per year over the last decade (Esty, 2005)</p>

Bulk of Project Finance today in developing countries

- 63% of the project loan amounts to developed world in 2000
- Less than 30% over the last decade

□ Importance of Project Finance:

- In 2004, US corporations invest \$34 billion in project finance
- More than \$25 billion that VC funds invested in startups
- About half of \$73 billion raised by US companies through IPOs
- □ Yet, very little academic research in Project Finance
  - More than 50 papers in A journals in VC and IPO areas
  - Not even one in an A journal in Project Finance!

### Critical Importance of Project Finance in India

□India needs to double its infrastructure spending to \$1 trillion in the five years to 2016-17 to achieve 10% annual growth rates (Mint, 23<sup>rd</sup> March '10)

"It will not happen automatically. We would need continuous improvements in our policy regime and implementation process"

-Prime Minister's statement

One aspect of this implementationProject Financing vs. Corporate Debt Financing

### Main Thesis of our research

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Project Finance offers an alternative method of financing to corporate debt finance for financing large projects
 when legal protection of outside investors is poor

Country's laws and enforcement provide weak protection to outside investors

Possibility of expropriation of outside investors by insiders in Corporate Debt Finance => Reduced debt capacity

□Inefficiency created by weak legal protection: reduced debt capacity in Corporate Debt Finance


Project Finance is a organizational/ contractual response to such inefficiency

### **Key Findings**

- □ We find using Bank Loans in thirty-nine countries
- Project Finance is more likely in countries where:
  - Legal protection against insider stealing is weak
  - Creditor protection are weak
- Laws against insider stealing & creditor rights substitute for each other
- Offer a new illustration in the context of debt financing that Law matters!
  - Project Finance offers a private and <u>costly</u> substitute for weak legal investor protection
  - Stronger investor protection lead to more Corporate Debt finance

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#### Institutional Features



- □ Nevitt and Fabozzi (2000): PF involves four distinguishing features
  - 1. Creation of a legally independent project company
  - 2. Project Company invests only in the project for which it was created
  - 3. Project debt is structured without recourse to sponsor
- =>Project cash flows are the essential means to repay lender
- □ Fourth essential feature underemphasized by existing literature
  - PF involves severe constraints on use and disposition of project cash flows
- □ PF involves high leverage, bulk of which is bank debt

#### Project Finance versus Corporate Debt Finance

Project Finance

□Single, discrete project in an independent entity

Easy separation of project cash flows

□Cost of lender monitoring of project cash flows low

□Minimal growth options

Detailed contractual arrangements over use of cash flow feasible



□One of multiple projects in the Sponsor Corporation

Project cash flows commingled with other projects of the sponsor

□Cost of lender monitoring of project cash flows high

□Valuable growth options

Detailed contractual arrangements over use of cash flow: (i) difficult (ii) costly


### The Cash Flow Waterfall Contract (CFWC)

- Project Company enters into detailed contracts
- Cash flow Waterfall Contract (CFWC): a critical contractual arrangement in PF
- Dictates the order in which project cash flows may be distributed (First for Operating expenses, then to pay interest and loan principal)
- □ Cash flow Waterfall Contract adjusts for a number of contingencies
  - Required payments may be increased/ decreased depending upon some key financial ratios
- CFWC commonly also includes "cash sharing", "mandatory cash sweep", "cash flow lockup" provisions
  - When project exceeds expectations, cash sharing provisions kick in
  - When the project performance is below expectation, lock up and mandatory cash sweep provisions may be triggered

#### Private Enforcement Mechanisms lend teeth to CFWC

- □ CFWC is enforced through a network of Project Escrow accounts
- Accounts are under the control of the lender
  - Provide the lender control over the borrower's activities without involving the lender in the borrower's day-to-day business activities.
- □ Lender-controlled project accounts lend teeth to CFWC
  - The teeth matter especially in weak legal environments (poor enforcement)

#### Project Finance enhances cash flow verifiability



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### Costs and benefits of Project Finance vis-à-vis Corporate Debt Finance

□Compared to Corporate Debt Finance, Project Finance offers the benefit of cash flow verifiability

□Primary cost: Loss of managerial flexibility

- Cash flow controls preclude managers from funding any growth opportunities
- Bill Young (Head of Specialized Finance Group at BP-Amoco): "I think of Corporate Finance as a way to avoid the inflexibility associated with Project Finance. When you sign a Project Finance deal, you have to live with a giant stack of documents full of provisions that hinder your ability to respond to a changing environment or to exploit opportunities." (Esty and Kane, 2001)

Secondary cost: Considerable transaction costs

### **Empirical Hypotheses**

□H1: Project Finance more likely than Corporate Debt Finance when protection against insider stealing is weaker

□H2: Project Finance more likely than Corporate Debt Finance when creditor protection is weaker

□H3: Creditor protection and protection against insider stealing are substitutes

□H4: "No automatic stay on secured assets" component should have a greater effect than the other components of creditor rights

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#### Dependent Variable

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Bank loans to Project Finance <u>versus</u>

## Bank loans to Corporations for their large investments (Corporate Debt Finance)

Bank loans comprise bulk (80%) of Project Debt

#### □Corporate Debt Finance:

- Capital expenditure loans
- Corporate Purpose Term Loans > \$ 0.5mn (min. size of Project Finance loan)

#### Data from Dealscan

#### DExclude some outlier industries

- Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (only seven Project Finance deals)
- Public Administration (only four Corporate Debt Finance deals)

#### Loan Characteristics for PF and CDF categories

Summary Statistic	Project Finance	Capital expenditures	Corporate Purpose Term loans		
Observations	1595	774	2743		
		Deal Amount (in \$	millions)		
Mean	255.2	215.5	244.4		
Median	123.9	155.0	100.0		
Std. Devn.	482.2	597.9	635.1		
Minimum	0.5	0.5	0.8		
Maximum	10513.8	10586.3	10588.9		
	Maturity (in years)				
Mean	10.7	10.5	10.4		
Median	10.6	10.5	10.4		
Std. Devn.	0.7	0.4	0.4		
Minimum	9.5	9.5	9.5		
Maximum	20.0	12.8	12.8		
		Number of Lei	nders		
Mean	7.1	5.3	5.0		
Median	4	3	3		
Std. Devn.	7.4	6.1	6.4		
Minimum	1	1	1		
Maximum	50	48	96		

Legal Protection of Outside Investors

- Legal protection against insider stealing
  - Ex-post index of Self-dealing (Djankov et. al., 2006)
     Measures hurdles that insiders must overcome to self-deal
  - 1- Dyck-Zingales control premium
    - Market price based measure => can capture enforcement as well
    - Complements the lawyer survey based DLLS measures


□ Index of Creditor Rights (Djankov et. al., 2005)


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
#### Agenda

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#### Univariate investigation







#### **Empirical Strategy**

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- □ Challenges in inferring a causal relationship:
  - Omitted variables at deal, borrower or lender level
  - Country-level laws correlated with other country-level unobserved factors
  - Other systematic differences in countries driving the choice
- □ Empirical analysis in five steps:
  - 1. Deal-level logit regressions PF vs. CDF
  - 2. Industry-level regressions using % of PF as dependent variable
  - 3. Difference-in-difference tests exploiting changes in legal variables
  - 4. Relative effect of "no automatic stay on secured assets" versus other components
  - 5. Inter-industry differences based on free cash flow/assets

#### Table 2

#### Logit Regressions: y=1 if PF; 0 if CDF

Protection against Insider Stealing	g -0.745***	-0.964***	-0.743***	-1.187***	-0.677***	-0.941***
	(4.28)	(3.11)	(3.48)	(3.79)	(3.53)	(3.00)
Protection against Insider Stealing	` /	0.134***	0.107**	0.157***	0.113**	0.136***
* Creditor Rights	(2.40)	(3.63)	(2.12)	(5.17)	(2.34)	(3.40)
Creditor rights	-0.093*	-0.140***	-0.090*	-0.160***	-0.099**	-0.146**
	(1.90)	(2.84)	(1.83)	(4.14)	(2.03)	(2.89)
All in spread drawn	~ /	~ /	~ /	~ /	-0.056	-0.075**
•					(1.27)	(2.01)
Log of Deal Amount					-0.003	-0.008
2					(0.31)	(0.93)
One if Secured					0.015	0.017
					(1.29)	(1.38)
Maturity					0.129**	0.103
2					(2.22)	(1.58)
One if Borrower not rated					0.034	0.018
	Robu	st Standard	Errors		(1.02)	(0.62)
One if Senior	clus	torod by co	untry		-0.136	-0.132
	Clus	tered by co	untry		(1.56)	(1.54)
Free Cash Flow / Assets					0.122***	0.111**
					(5.76)	(5.46)
Tangibility					0.116**	0.077*
0,00					(2.56)	(1.74)
Interest Expense / Net Income					0.012	0.005
-					(1.43)	(0.59)
LT Debt / Total Assets					0.229***	0.225***
					(4.19)	(3.54)
Tobin's Q					0.100	0.063
-					(1.05)	(0.69)
LT Debt / Total Assets * Tobin's	Q				0.799***	0.742**
					(8.13)	(6.79)
Sample	Full	Full	Excludes	Corporate	Full	Full
-				erm Loans		
Borrower Random Effects	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Industry Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	5005	4964	2296	2264	4533	4493
R-squared	0.39	0.46	0.24	0.36	0.68	0.71

#### Table 3 (Industry level OLS regressions)

C         (7.84)         (5.89)         (3.70)         (4.66)         (4.14)         (5.25)           Protection against Insider Stealing * Creditor Rights         0.044**         0.071***         0.061         0.126***         0.015*         0.029***           Creditor Rights         (2.48)         (3.69)         (1.60)         (3.75)         (2.00)         (3.09)           Creditor rights         -0.027*         -0.063**         -0.047*         -0.125***         -0.008*         -0.025**           Average of All in spread drawn         0.020         0.016         (0.75)         (0.51)           Average of Log of Deal Amount         0.047*         -0.125***         -0.004         0.001           % of Secured Loans         0.016**         0.018***         0.1016**         0.018***           Average Maturity         0.126***         0.131***         (7.86)         (6.89)           % of Borrowers not rated         0.046         0.038         (1.62)         (1.29)           % of Senior loans         -0.043*         -0.043*         -0.043*           Free Cash Flow / Assets         0.14***         0.135***         (1.62)         (1.29)           % of Senior loans         -0.028*         0.025*         (2.00)         (1.98)	Protection against Insider Stealing	-0.702***	-1.153***	-0.651***	-1.220***	-0.242***	-0.502***
Protection against Insider Stealing         0.044**         0.071***         0.061         0.126***         0.015*         0.029***           * Creditor Rights         (2.48)         (3.69)         (1.60)         (3.75)         (2.00)         (3.09)           Creditor rights         -0.027*         -0.063**         -0.047*         -0.125***         -0.008*         -0.025**           Average of All in spread drawn         0.063**         0.047*         -0.125***         0.020         0.016           Average of Log of Deal Amount         0.004         0.001         (0.75)         (0.51)           Average of Log of Deal Amount         0.004         0.018**         (0.43)         (0.10)           % of Secured Loans         0.126***         0.12***         (2.29)         (2.78)           Average Maturity         0.126***         0.11***         (2.62)         (2.78)           % of Borrowers not rated         0.046         0.038         (0.162)         (1.29)           % of Senior loans         -0.043*         -0.043*         -0.043*         -0.043*           Free Cash Flow / Assets         0.144***         0.375         (1.07)         (0.95)           Interest Expense / Net Income         0.028*         0.259**         (2.20)	g						
* Creditor Rights       (2.48)       (3.69)       (1.60)       (3.75)       (2.00)       (3.09)         Creditor rights       -0.027*       -0.063**       -0.047*       -0.125***       -0.008*       -0.025**         Average of All in spread drawn       (1.65)       (2.56)       (1.72)       (3.02)       (1.66)       (2.24)         Average of Log of Deal Amount       (0.62)       (0.61)       (0.75)       (0.51)         Average of Log of Deal Amount       (0.43)       (0.10)       (0.43)       (0.10)         % of Secured Loans       0.016**       (0.29)       (2.78)         Average Maturity       0.126***       0.131***       (2.29)       (2.78)         % of Borrowers not rated       0.046       0.038       (1.62)       (1.29)         % of Senior loans       (1.62)       (1.29)       (2.17)         Free Cash Flow / Assets       (1.85)       (2.17)         Tree Cash Flow / Assets       (1.85)       (2.17)         Tree Cash Flow / Assets       (1.20)       (1.29)         Interest Expense / Net Income       0.028*       0.028*       0.025*         It Debt / Total Assets * Tobin's Q       (2.13)       (2.29)       (2.13)       (2.29)         Sample       <	Protection against Insider Stealing	· · ·	`` /	· · ·	· · · ·	· /	· · · · ·
(1.68)         (2.56)         (1.72)         (3.02)         (1.76)         (2.24)           Average of All in spread drawn         0.020         0.016         (0.75)         (0.51)           Average of Log of Deal Amount         0.004         0.001         (0.43)         (0.10)           % of Secured Loans         0.016**         0.018***         (1.62)         (1.72)           Average Maturity         0.126***         0.131***         (7.86)         (6.89)           % of Borrowers not rated         0.046         0.038         (1.62)         (1.29)           % of Senior loans         -0.043*         -0.043*         0.013****           % of Senior loans         -0.043*         0.014***         0.13****           Tangibility         0.888         0.075         (1.77)         (0.95)           Interest Expense / Net Income         0.028*         0.028*         0.025*           LT Debt / Total Assets         0.250**         (2.13)         (2.29)           Tobin's Q         0.044         0.020         (0.44         0.020           LT Debt / Total Assets * Tobin's Q         (2.13)         (2.29)         (2.40)         (1.77)         (9.95)           Industry Fixed Effects         No         No		(2.48)	(3.69)	(1.60)	(3.75)	(2.00)	(3.09)
Average of All in spread drawn       0.020       0.016         Average of Log of Deal Amount       0.004       0.001         % of Secured Loans       0.016**       0.018***         Average Maturity       0.126***       0.131***         % of Borrowers not rated       0.046       0.038         % of Secured Loans       0.046       0.038         % of Borrowers not rated       0.046       0.048**         % of Senior loans       -0.043*       -0.043*          -0.043*       -0.048**         (1.62)       (1.29)         % of Senior loans       -0.043*       -0.048**          (1.62)       (1.27)         Free Cash Flow / Assets       0.126***       0.135***         Tangibility       0.088       0.075         Interest Expense / Net Income       0.0250**       0.263**          (2.10)       (1.98)         LT Debt / Total Assets       0.250**       0.263**         Sample       Full       Full       Excludes Corporate         Purpose Term Loans       No       No       No         No       No       No       No       Yes         Yes       Yes       Yes       Yes <td>Creditor rights</td> <td> /</td> <td>-0.063**</td> <td>-0.047*</td> <td>-0.125***</td> <td>-0.008*</td> <td>-0.025**</td>	Creditor rights	/	-0.063**	-0.047*	-0.125***	-0.008*	-0.025**
Average of Log of Deal Amount       (0.75)       (0.51)         Average of Log of Deal Amount       0.004       0.001         % of Secured Loans       (0.75)       (0.10)         Average Maturity       (2.29)       (2.78)         Average Maturity       0.126***       0.131***         (7.86)       (6.89)       (0.046)       0.038         % of Borrowers not rated       0.046       0.038       (1.62)       (1.29)         % of Senior loans       -0.043*       -0.043*       -0.043*         % of Senior loans       (1.85)       (2.17)         Free Cash Flow / Assets       (1.85)       (2.17)         Free Cash Flow / Assets       (1.07)       (0.95)         Interest Expense / Net Income       0.028*       0.028*         (2.00)       (1.98)       (1.07)       (0.95)         Interest Expense / Net Income       0.250**       0.263**         (2.00)       (1.98)       (0.44)       (0.23)         LT Debt / Total Assets * Tobin's Q       (0.46)       (0.23)         LT Debt / Total Assets * Tobin's Q       (0.46)       (0.23)         Sample       Full       Full       Excludes Corporate Purpose Term Loans         Year Fixed Effects       No	-	(1.68)	(2.56)	(1.72)	(3.02)	(1.76)	(2.24)
Average of Log of Deal Amount       0.004       0.001         % of Secured Loans       (0.43)       (0.10)         % of Secured Loans       0.016**       0.018***         Average Maturity       0.126***       0.131***         % of Borrowers not rated       0.046       0.038         % of Senior loans       -0.043*       -0.048**         % of Senior loans       -0.046**       0.131***         % of Senior loans       -0.046       0.038         1.62)       (1.29)       (1.62)       (1.29)         % of Senior loans       -0.048**       0.135***         Tangibility       0.088       0.075         Interest Expense / Net Income       0.028*       0.028*         UT Debt / Total Assets       0.250**       0.263**         Co.00       (1.98)       1.318***       1.245***         LT Debt / Total Assets * Tobin's Q       0.046       (0.23)         LT Debt / Total Assets * Tobin's Q       1.318***       1.245***         Sample       Full       Full       Full       Full         Industry Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No       No         Year Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No	Average of All in spread drawn					0.020	0.016
% of Secured Loans         (0.43)         (0.10)           % of Secured Loans         (2.29)         (2.78)           Average Maturity         (7.86)         (6.89)           % of Borrowers not rated         0.046         0.038           % of Senior loans         (1.62)         (1.29)           % of Senior loans         -0.043*         -0.048**           (1.62)         (1.29)         (3.76)         (3.76)           Year Fixed Effects         (0.44)         (0.028*         0.025*           (1.07)         (0.95)         (1.07)         (0.95)           Interest Expense / Net Income         (0.200)         (1.98)           LT Debt / Total Assets         0.250**         0.263**           (2.00)         (1.98)         (1.77)         (2.29)           Tobin's Q         (0.46)         (0.23)         (1.77)           Sample         Full         Full         Excludes Corporate Purpose Term Loans         Full         Full           Industry Fixed Effects         No         No         No         No         No         Yeas         <						(0.75)	(0.51)
% of Secured Loans       0.016**       0.018***         Average Maturity       0.126***       0.131***         % of Borrowers not rated       0.046       0.038         % of Senior loans       0.046       0.038         % of Senior loans       -0.043*       -0.048**         % of Senior loans       -0.043**       0.015***         % of Senior loans       -0.043**       0.048**         1.62)       (1.7)       0.048**         1.0014***       0.135***       (3.76)       (3.76)         Tangibility       0.028*       0.025*       (1.07)         Interest Expense / Net Income       0.028*       0.026**       (2.29)         Velt / Total Assets       705       (1.07)       (0.46)       (0.23)         LT Debt / Total Assets * Tobin's Q       1.318***       1.245***         Mode       No	Average of Log of Deal Amount					0.004	0.001
Average Maturity       (2.29)       (2.78)         Average Maturity       0.126***       0.131***         % of Borrowers not rated       0.046       0.038         % of Senior loans       (1.62)       (1.29)         % of Senior loans       -0.043*       -0.048**         Free Cash Flow / Assets       0.144***       0.135***         Gamma Cash Flow / Assets       (1.62)       (1.29)         % of Senior loans       -0.043*       -0.048**         Interest Expense / Net Income       (3.76)       (3.76)         Interest Expense / Net Income       0.028*       0.025*         IT Debt / Total Assets       0.250**       0.263**         Tobin's Q       0.044       0.020         IT Debt / Total Assets * Tobin's Q       1.318***       1.245***         Sample       Full       Full       Excludes Corporate Purpose Term Loans       Full         Industry Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No       Yes         Year Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No       Yes       Yes         Observations       1795       1762       1212       2264       1677       1645 <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>· /</td> <td>· /</td>						· /	· /
Average Maturity       0.126***       0.131***         % of Borrowers not rated       (7.86)       (6.89)         % of Senior loans       (1.62)       (1.29)         % of Senior loans       -0.043*       -0.048**         (1.85)       (2.17)         Free Cash Flow / Assets       0.124***       0.135***         Tangibility       0.046       0.038         Interest Expense / Net Income       (3.76)       (3.76)         LT Debt / Total Assets       0.250**       0.263**         (2.13)       (2.29)       (2.13)       (2.29)         Tobin's Q       (4.74)       (4.45)         Sample       Full       Full       Excludes Corporate Purpose Term Loans         Industry Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No         Vear Fixed Effects       No       No       No       Yes       Yes         Observations       1795       1762       1212       2264       1677       1645	% of Secured Loans						
% of Borrowers not rated       (7.86)       (6.89)         % of Borrowers not rated       0.046       0.038         % of Senior loans       (1.62)       (1.29)         % of Senior loans       -0.048**       (1.85)       (2.17)         Free Cash Flow / Assets       0.144***       0.135***       (3.76)       (3.76)         Tangibility       0.088       0.075       (1.07)       (0.95)         Interest Expense / Net Income       (2.00)       (1.98)       (1.98)         LT Debt / Total Assets       0.250**       0.263**       (2.13)       (2.29)         Tobin's Q       0.044       0.020       (0.46)       (0.23)         LT Debt / Total Assets * Tobin's Q       1.318***       1.245***       (4.74)       (4.45)         Sample       Full       Full       Excludes Corporate Purpose Term Loans       Full       Full       Full         Industry Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No       Yes       Yes         Vear Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No       Yes       Yes         Observations       1795       1762       1212       2264       1677       1645						· /	· · · ·
% of Borrowers not rated       0.046       0.038         % of Senior loans       (1.62)       (1.29)         % of Senior loans       -0.043*       -0.048**         Free Cash Flow / Assets       0.144***       0.135***         Gamma Cases       (1.62)       (1.29)         % of Senior loans       -0.043*       -0.048**         Free Cash Flow / Assets       0.144***       0.135***         Gamma Cases       (3.76)       (3.76)         Tangibility       0.088       0.075         Interest Expense / Net Income       0.028*       0.028*         LT Debt / Total Assets       0.250**       0.263**         C2.00)       (1.98)       (2.13)       (2.29)         Tobin's Q       0.044       0.020         LT Debt / Total Assets * Tobin's Q       (0.46)       (0.23)         LT Debt / Total Assets * Tobin's Q       1.318***       1.245***         Multistry Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No         Industry Fixed Effects       No       No       No       Yes       Yes         Vear Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No       Yes       Yes         Observations       1795       1762	Average Maturity						
% of Senior loans       (1.62)       (1.29)         % of Senior loans       -0.043*       -0.048**         Free Cash Flow / Assets       (1.85)       (2.17)         Free Cash Flow / Assets       0.144***       0.135***         Tangibility       0.088       0.075         Interest Expense / Net Income       0.028*       0.025*         Interest Expense / Net Income       0.028*       0.025*         Interest Expense / Net Income       0.028*       0.263**         Interest Expense / Net Income       0.026*       0.263**         Interest Expense / Net Income       0.044       0.020         Interest Expense / Net Income       1.318***       1.245***         Interest Expense / Net Income       1.318***       1.245***         Interest Expense / Net Income       No       No       No         Industry Fixed Effects       No       No       No       Yes </td <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>· /</td> <td></td>						· /	
	% of Borrowers not rated						
Free Cash Flow / Assets       (1.85)       (2.17)         Free Cash Flow / Assets       0.144***       0.135***         Tangibility       0.088       0.075         Tangibility       0.025*       (1.07)       (0.95)         Interest Expense / Net Income       0.028*       0.025*         LT Debt / Total Assets       0.250**       0.263**         Tobin's Q       (1.41)       (2.13)       (2.29)         Tobin's Q       0.044       0.020         LT Debt / Total Assets * Tobin's Q       1.318***       1.245***         Sample       Full       Full       Excludes Corporate Purpose Term Loans       Full         Industry Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No       Yes         Vear Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No       Yes       Yes         Observations       1795       1762       1212       2264       1677       1645							· /
Free Cash Flow / Assets       0.144***       0.135***         Tangibility       0.088       0.075         Tangibility       0.088       0.075         Interest Expense / Net Income       0.028*       0.025*         Interest Expense / Net Income       0.028*       0.025*         Interest Expense / Net Income       0.028*       0.025*         Interest Expense / Net Income       0.028*       0.263**         Interest Expense / Net Income       0.250**       0.263**         Interest Expense / Net Income       0.044       0.020         Interest Expense / Net Income       0.044       0.020         Interest Expense / Total Assets       Tobin's Q       0.44***       0.263**         Industry Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No       No         Industry Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No       Yes       Yes         Vear Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No       Yes       Yes         Observations       1795       1762       1212       2264       1677       1645	% of Senior loans						
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$						· /	· · ·
Tangibility       0.088       0.075         Interest Expense / Net Income       0.028*       0.025*         Interest Expense / Net Income       0.028*       0.025*         LT Debt / Total Assets       0.250**       0.263**         Tobin's Q       0.044       0.020         IT Debt / Total Assets * Tobin's Q       0.044       0.020         Industry Fixed Effects       No       No       No         No       No       No       No       Yes         Vear Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No         Observations       1795       1762       1212       2264       1677       1645	Free Cash Flow / Assets						
Interest Expense / Net Income       (1.07)       (0.95)         Interest Expense / Net Income       0.028*       0.025*         LT Debt / Total Assets       0.250**       0.263**         Tobin's Q       0.044       0.020         Tobin's Q       0.044       0.020         LT Debt / Total Assets * Tobin's Q       1.318***       1.245***         Sample       Full       Full       Excludes Corporate Purpose Term Loans         Industry Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No         Year Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No       Yes       Yes         Observations       1795       1762       1212       2264       1677       1645						· /	· /
Interest Expense / Net Income       0.028*       0.025*         LT Debt / Total Assets       0.250**       0.263**         Tobin's Q       (2.13)       (2.29)         Tobin's Q       0.044       0.020         LT Debt / Total Assets * Tobin's Q       (0.46)       (0.23)         LT Debt / Total Assets * Tobin's Q       1.318***       1.245***         Sample       Full       Full       Excludes Corporate Purpose Term Loans         Industry Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No         Vear Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No         Observations       1795       1762       1212       2264       1677       1645	Tangibility						
LT Debt / Total Assets       (2.00)       (1.98)         LT Debt / Total Assets       0.250**       0.263**         Tobin's Q       (2.13)       (2.29)         Tobin's Q       0.044       0.020         LT Debt / Total Assets * Tobin's Q       1.318***       1.245***         Sample       Full       Full       Excludes Corporate Purpose Term Loans         Industry Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No         Year Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No       Yes         Observations       1795       1762       1212       2264       1677       1645							
LT Debt / Total Assets       0.250**       0.263**         Tobin's Q       (2.13)       (2.29)         Tobin's Q       0.044       0.020         LT Debt / Total Assets * Tobin's Q       1.318***       1.245***         Sample       Full       Full       Excludes Corporate Purpose Term Loans         Industry Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No         Year Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No         Observations       1795       1762       1212       2264       1677       1645	Interest Expense / Net Income						
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$							· /
Tobin's Q       0.044       0.020         LT Debt / Total Assets * Tobin's Q       (0.46)       (0.23)         LT Debt / Total Assets * Tobin's Q       1.318***       1.245***         Sample       Full       Full       Excludes Corporate Purpose Term Loans         Industry Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No         Year Fixed Effects       No       No       No       Yes       Yes         Observations       1795       1762       1212       2264       1677       1645	LT Debt / Total Assets						
LT Debt / Total Assets * Tobin's Q       (0.46)       (0.23)         LT Debt / Total Assets * Tobin's Q       1.318***       1.245***         Sample       Full       Full       Excludes Corporate       Full       Full         Sample       Full       Full       Excludes Corporate       Full       Full         Industry Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No       Yes       Yes         Year Fixed Effects       No       No       No       No       No       Yes       Yes         Observations       1795       1762       1212       2264       1677       1645	<b>T</b> 1' 1 O					· · ·	· · ·
LT Debt / Total Assets * Tobin's Q1.318***1.245***SampleFullFullExcludes Corporate Purpose Term LoansFullFullIndustry Fixed EffectsNoNoNoNoYesYesYear Fixed EffectsNoNoNoNoYesYesObservations179517621212226416771645	Tobin's Q						
SampleFullFullExcludes Corporate Purpose Term LoansFullFullIndustry Fixed EffectsNoNoNoNoYesYesYear Fixed EffectsNoNoNoNoNoYesYesObservations179517621212226416771645						· /	· /
SampleFullFullExcludes Corporate Purpose Term LoansFullFullIndustry Fixed EffectsNoNoNoNoYesYesYear Fixed EffectsNoNoNoNoYesYesObservations179517621212226416771645	LT Debt / Total Assets * Tobin's Q						
Industry Fixed EffectsNoNoNoYesYesYear Fixed EffectsNoNoNoNoYesYesObservations179517621212226416771645		F 11	<b>E</b> 11	<b>E</b> 1 1	<u> </u>		· /
Industry Fixed EffectsNoNoNoYesYesYear Fixed EffectsNoNoNoNoYesYesObservations179517621212226416771645	Sample	Full	Full		-	Full	Full
Year Fixed EffectsNoNoNoYesYesObservations179517621212226416771645	In duction Direct Difference	NT-	NT-	-		V	V
Observations 1795 1762 1212 2264 1677 1645	-						
	Observations R-squared	0.16	0.19	0.09	0.36	0.75	0.75

#### Table 4 (Controlling for various country level factors)

				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Protection against Insider	-1.863***	-1.581***	-0.871**	-0.779*
Stealing	(3.44)	(4.59)	(2.29)	(1.99)
Protection against Insider	0.155***	0.177***	0.057*	0.098**
Stealing * Creditor Rights	(4.42)	(9.96)	(1.83)	(2.59)
Creditor rights	-0.124***	-0.178***	-0.041	-0.092**
	(3.90)	(9.14)	(1.46)	(2.20)
French legal origin dummy	-0.536*	-0.466**	-0.220	-0.227
	(1.83)	(2.46)	(1.37)	(1.27)
German legal origin dummy	-0.346**	-0.274***	-0.115	-0.075
	(2.19)	(3.10)	(1.05)	(0.73)
Scandinavian legal origin	-0.352*	-0.190**	-0.258**	-0.146**
dummy	(1.85)	(2.38)	(2.28)	(2.65)
Enforceability of contracts	0.017	-0.014	-0.011	-0.025**
	(0.59)	(0.71)	(0.75)	(2.21)
Rule of Law	0.160**	0.112**	0.072*	0.114***
	(2.47)	(2.22)	(1.77)	(3.45)
Corruption	-0.153**	-0.138***	-0.038	-0.075*
_	(2.26)	(3.39)	(0.91)	(1.78)
Efficiency of Judicial	-0.056*	-0.037	-0.039*	-0.049**
System	(1.65)	(1.23)	(1.92)	(2.37)
Index of Political Rights	0.070**	0.075***	0.046*	0.073***
	(2.12)	(3.25)	(1.91)	(3.31)
Legal Formalism Index	0.132	0.162**	0.061	0.118**
	(1.44)	(2.55)	(1.30)	(2.53)
Public enforcement index	-0.112	-0.148**	-0.018	-0.095*
	(1.21)	(2.32)	(0.34)	(1.72)
One if information sharing	0.376***	0.285***	0.173	0.238**
operates in 1999	(2.75)	(3.14)	(1.55)	(2.56)
Efficiency of the	-0.005	-0.004*	-0.001	-0.003
Bankruptcy Procedure	(1.30)	(1.96)	(0.66)	(1.54)
Log of GDP per capita	0.374*	0.381**	0.114	0.181
	(1.73)	(2.23)	(0.97)	(1.16)
Log of Private Credit to	0.252	0.171*	0.062	0.024
GDP per capita	(1.64)	(1.93)	(0.83)	(0.33)
Accounting Standards	-0.006**	-0.001	-0.003	0.004*
	(2.18)	(0.22)	(1.16)	(1.73)
Sample	Deal	Deal	Country,	Country,
			Industry,	Industry,
			Year	Year
Borrower Random Effects	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A
Industry Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4534	4494	1678	1646
R-squared	0.58	0.62	0.40	0.42

#### Difference-in-difference tests using legal changes

□Country-level changes in creditor rights and in shareholders' right to bring derivative suits

Shareholder derivative suit: "An action brought by a shareholder of a company in the name and on behalf of that company in order to seek redress for a harm done to the company by the company's directors or officers"

Availability of shareholder derivative suits offers an important mechanism for the private enforcement of managers' fiduciary duties

Wider availability of shareholder derivative suits => stronger constraints on insider stealing

□This legal feature is included as a component of the index of ex-post private control of self-dealing

#### Table 5: Country level legal changes

	1	ng Shareholder Derivative Suits						
Country Name Year		Country Name Year		Country Name Year		Country Name Year Country Na		Year
1998	Australia	2000 (Instituted)						
1995	Germany	1998 (minimum share ownership required fo enforcing claims changed from 10% to 5%)						
1999	Italy	1998 (minimum share ownership required fo enforcing claims changed from 10% to 5%)						
1995	Mexico	2001 (minimum share ownership required fo enforcing claims changed from 33% to 15%)						
1998		enforcing claims changed from 5576 to 1576)						
_	1995 1999 1995	1995 Germany 1999 Italy 1995 Mexico						

#### Table 5 - Difference-in-difference tests

Change in Creditor Rights	-0.052*** (8.24)	-0.124*** (9.79)	
Change in Creditor Rights Dummy *	0.017***		
Ex-post private control of self-dealing	(7.24)		
Change in Creditor Rights Dummy *		0.030***	
(1 - Dyck Zingales Control Premium)		(9.48)	
Change in Derivative Suit Rules Dummy			-0.108***
			(7.23)
Change in Derivative Suit Rules Dummy			0.035***
* Creditor Rights			(38.73)
Borrower Fixed Effects <sup>1</sup>	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4727	4686	4747
R-squared	0.29	0.31	0.32

<sup>1</sup> The borrower fixed effects subsume country and industry fixed effects

#### Discussion of Difference-in-difference tests

□Potential endogenous factors in our cross-country tests

□First, PF involves an asset choice + a financing choice (Esty, 2003)

May be employed relatively more than CDF in industries that employ assets involving costly agency conflicts.

□Second, pattern of industries in different countries potentially correlated systematically with country-wide unobserved factors

Could drive the choice of Project Finance in these industries

Third, what if rule of law, enforcement of contracts, efficiency of the judiciary, etc. capture enforcement of criminal law but not corporate or bankruptcy laws?

Enforcement of these laws may be omitted variables that are correlated with the laws themselves.

Difference-in-difference tests exploit variation across time within a given industry in a given country

Provide strong support for the evidence noted in the cross-sectional tests

#### Table 6: No Automatic Stay on Secured Assets

□Hart (1995): ability to seize assets crucial to force a borrower to repay

Image: "No automatic stay on secured assets" component of creditor rights should have a relatively greater effect than other components

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Proxy for Protection against Insider Stealing:	Ex-post	1 – Dyck	Ex-post	1 – Dyck
	private	Zingales	private	Zingales
	control of	Control	control of	Control
	self-dealing	Premium	self-dealing	Premium
Protection against Insider Stealing	-1.150***	-2.099***	-0.833***	-1.458***
	(6.05)	(4.64)	(4.60)	(3.07)
No automatic stay on secured assets	-0.169***	-0.256***	-0.081**	<b>-</b> 0.146***
	(6.72)	(10.35)	(2.05)	(3.10)
Secured creditors first paid	-0.057***	-0.09***	-0.038**	-0.065**
	(3.56)	(2.76)	(2.71)	(2.07)
Restrictions for going into reorganization	-0.002	-0.053	-0.015	-0.029
	(0.05)	(1.43)	(0.76)	(0.95)
Management does not stay in reorganization	0.113**	0.086	0.065*	0.015
	(2.37)	(0.88)	(1.92)	(0.19)
No automatic stay on secured assets *	0.291***	0.300***	0.154**	0.181***
Protection against Insider Stealing	(8.25)	(10.44)	(2.43)	(3.36)
Secured creditors first paid *	0.072***	0.111***	0.052**	0.078**
Protection against Insider Stealing	(3.80)	(3.07)	(2.68)	(2.14)
Restrictions for going into reorganization *	0.001	0.055	0.023	0.028
Protection against Insider Stealing	(0.01)	(1.18)	(0.75)	(0.77)
Management does not stay in reorganization *	-0.190***	-0.086	-0.116**	-0.019
Protection against Insider Stealing	(2.74)	(0.78)	(2.21)	(0.22)
Sample aggregated at what level?:	Deal	Deal	Country,	Country,
			Industry	Industry

#### Table 7: Examine robustness to several other channels

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□Intern-industry differences result could be due to:

- Industry level factors other than free cash flow to assets
- Country level factors other than protection against insider stealing and creditor rights

□Alternative Story 1: Greater debt capacity due to reduction in deadweight costs from debt-equity conflicts

Add an interaction of growth opportunities (Tobin's Q) and leverage (long term debt to assets)

□Alternative Story 2: A more efficient bankruptcy process rather than our country level variables

Add interaction of DHMS measure of efficiency of bankruptcy procedure with fcf/assets

□Alternative Story 3: Other country level variables

Add interactions of <u>all other</u> country level variables with fcf/assets

#### Economic Magnitudes

One standard deviation ↑ in legal protection against insider stealing:

■ likelihood of Project Finance ↓ by 4.3% - 5.5%

 $\Box$  One point  $\uparrow$  in creditor rights:

■ likelihood of Project Finance ↓ by 6.7% - 13.1%

I marginal effect of legal protection against insider stealing ↓ by 9.1% - 16.2%

Compare two industries with FCF/ assets one standard deviation apart:

Economic effects larger in higher FCF industry by 13.8% to 17.5%

### Project Finance vis-à-vis other related mechanisms

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□Separate legal incorporation: Necessary but not sufficient

Makes cash flow separation and the CFWC feasible

Not sufficient however; eg. Subsidiary company

□Secured debt with high leverage (SDHL): offers some advantages of PF but is not a substitute

- SDHL collateralizes debt with specific assets similar to PF
- High leverage reduces agency costs of free cash flow
- SDHL misses the Cash flow verifiability and control of the cash that is central to PF
- In PF, the CFW arrangement adjusts to absorb any free cash irrespective of whether the project generates more or less cash than anticipated

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#### Agenda

Motivation and Introduction	1
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses	4
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Summary and Conclusion	38

### Summary of Findings

- Law and Finance literature (LLSV, 1997, 1998):
  - Legal investor protection varies systematically across countries
- □ We show in the context of financing of large investments:
  - Market participants respond to inefficiencies created by weak legal protection using Project Finance
  - Project Finance combines extensive contractual arrangements with private enforcement mechanisms to enhance debt capacity by making cash flows verifiable

### Key Contribution

□Our study is the first to offer empirical evidence

using a large, cross-country sample

of market participants' private contractual responses to weak legal environments

Possibly the first A-journal research paper on Project Finance

#### Implications

Stronger legal protection of outside investors
 Stronger legal protection against insider stealing
 Stronger creditor rights

Leads to more Corporate Debt Finance

□Obviates the need for costly private responses such as Project Finance

Project Finance is a specialized form of financing involving significant transaction costs

Law matters!