

# Global Financial Crisis: Impact on India

Mathew Joseph Pankaj Vashisht

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**Current Developments in Indian Financial System** 

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#### Roots of Global Crisis



- Global macroeconomic imbalances
  - Results in huge cross-border capital flows from surplus to deficit countries
  - International financial system failed to intermediate these flows properly
    - Lending to sub-prime borrowers/ imprudent credit expansion
    - Lack of effective supervision and regulation
  - Debt crisis of 1980s, East Asian crisis of late 1990s and the present global crisis
  - Current one the severest and the impact so enormous and widespread

#### Global Macroeconomic Imbalance

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
Table 1: Current Account Balance as % of GDP, 1995-2007											
	Australia	US	UK	Spain	China	Germany	Japan	Norway	Russia	Saudi Arabia	India
1995	-5.2	-1.5	-1.2	-0.3	0.2	-1.2	2.1	3.6	2.2	-3.7	-1.6
2000	-3.8	-4.3	-2.6	-4.0	1.7	-1.7	2.6	15	18	7.6	-1.0
2001	-2.0	-3.8	-2.1	-3.9	1.3	0	2.1	16.1	11.1	5.1	0.3
2002	-3.7	-4.4	-1.7	-3.3	2.4	2.0	2.9	12.6	8.4	6.3	1.4
2003	-5.3	-4.8	-1.6	-3.5	2.8	2.0	3.2	12.3	8.2	13.1	1.5
2004	-6.1	-5.3	-2.1	-5.3	3.6	4.7	3.7	12.7	10.1	20.8	0.1
2005	-5.8	-5.9	-2.6	-7.4	7.2	5.2	3.6	16.3	11	28.7	-1.3
2006	-5.3	-6.0	-3.4	-8.9	9.4	6.1	3.9	17.3	9.5	27.9	-1.1
2007	-6.2	-5.3	-3.8	-10.1	11.3	7.6	4.8	15.4	5.9	25.1	-1.4

Source: IMF.

- •Persistent deficits and surpluses among nations
- •India not part of global imbalances

#### Capital Inflows into India






Far exceeding the current account deficits!




#### India's Reserve Build-up



Turned out to be building up a war chest!




#### **Huge Stock Market Rally**



Stock index rising from an average 5500 during 2004 to over 20,000 in January 2008

#### Remarkable Growth Performance






- •Lifted to a new high growth trajectory
- •Cheap and plentiful supply foreign capital partly behind high growth

#### Overheating of Indian Economy






Note: HP filter technique as proposed by Hodrick and Prescott (1997)

- •GDP growth above potential rate in recent years
- •Inflation above 5 per cent from 2003-04

#### Monetary Tightening from 2004






• Tightening from Sep 2004 became harder from 2006-07








Slowdown of Q3 2007-08 to Q2 2008-09, RBI effect



#### **Global Crisis**

#### Reversal of Capital Flows from India






- •Huge FII outflows from India since December 2007 due to US financial meltdown (Massive de-leveraging of US banks)
- •FII equity outflows over US\$ 15.4 bn from Jan 08




#### Stock Market Crash



- •Plummeting from 20,873 on 8 Jan 08 to 9093 on 28 Nov, 56% fall
- •NYSE stock price fall started earlier (November 07) but much less steeper than BSE








- •Stock of Reserves falling from \$315 bn in May 08 to \$246 bn in Nov 08
- •Rupee tumbling by 20% from end-Mar 08 to end-Nov 08

### CRIER


#### **Liquidity Crisis**



- •Inter-bank call money rate spiking to 20% in October 08
- •Drying up funds from domestic and foreign capital markets leading to pressure on bank financing
- Outflow through banking channels

#### Credit Crunch to Low Credit Demand





- •In September and October 08, bank finance (loans & investments) rose to compensate for drying up funds from domestic and foreign capital markets
- •In November 08 onwards, bank finance expansion sharply lower as demand has fallen/bank averse to lending; and bank finance turned negative in Jan 09 and remained lower than last year level in February 09




#### Aggressive Policy Response

- RBI loosening cost and availability of liquidity in a series of steps from mid-September 08
  - Initial reluctance due to high inflation and aggressive response from mid-October 08

#### RBI Policy Rate Changes





- •Cash reserve ratio (CRR) brought down from 9% to 5%
- Statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) from 25% to 24%
- •Repo rate reduced from 9% to 5% & reverse repo rate from 6% to 3.5%
- •Special window for banks in their lending to mutual funds, NBFCs and housing finance companies
- •Refinance facility for banks from the central bank & dollar swap arrangements, etc.

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#### **RBI** Liquidity Injection

Actual/Potential Release of Primary Liquidity since Mid-September 2008 (Rs crore)					
1	Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) Reduction	1,60,000			
2	MSS Unwinding	63,045			
3	Term Repo Facility	60,000			
4	Increase in Export Credit Refinance	25,500			
5	Special Refinance Facility for SCBs (Non-RRB)	38,500			
6	Refinance Facility for SIDBI/NHB/EXIM Bank	16,000			
7	Liquidity Facility for NBFCs through SPV	25,000			
	Total (1 to 7) 3,88,0				
Memo	Memo: Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) Reduction 40,000				

Nearly Rs. 4000 bn (\$80 bn), over 7% of GDP of liquidity release





- Deterioration of the economy leading to Central government's three packages of fiscal stimulus in early Dec 08, early Jan 09, early Mar 09
  - Direct fiscal burden of stimulus just 1.8% of GDP
    - Across-the-board excise duty reduction by 4 %age points
    - Additional plan spending of Rs. 200 billion
    - State governments allowed additional market borrowing of Rs 300 billion for plan expenditure
    - Assistance to export industries
    - 2 percentage point reduction in central excise and service tax
  - Non-fiscal measures in package (ECB and FII debt inflow relaxations, IIFL tax-free bonds, etc.)
  - Fiscal deficit (Central and States combined) rising sharply to 11% of GDP in 2008-09 (5.4% in 2007-08) and likely to be over 10% in 2009-10
    - Loose fiscal policy due to domestic compulsions

### Sharp Real Sector deterioration from September 2008



Growth in Selected Economic Indicators (% Change, Y-O-Y)								
Apr-Aug 08	Sep-08	Oct-08	Nov-08	Dec-08	Jan-09	Feb-09		
4.8	6.0	0.1	1.7	-0.6	-0.5			
35.1	10.4	-12.1	-9.9	-1.1	-15.9	-13.7		
37.7	43.3	10.6	6.1	8.8	-18.2	-18.2		
8.6	8.2	-0.1	1.3	3.0	2.9			
8.7	1.1	-5.7	-4.6	0.0	-0.4			
3.9	-0.6	-34.9	-48.0	-58.2	-52.3	-31.7		
-0.8	-14.0	-7.7	-13.6	-12.6				
25.0	26.0	-4.6	-3.5	-18.6				
Q3 07-08	Q4 07-08	Q1 08-09	Q2 08-09	Q3 08-09				
8.8	8.8	7.9	7.6	5.3				
18.5	24.0	31.4	34.6	13.3				
21.2	7.1	4.7	-25.4	-25.6				
	Apr-Aug 08  4.8  35.1  37.7  8.6  8.7  3.9  -0.8  25.0  Q3 07-08  8.8  18.5	Apr-Aug 08       Sep-08         4.8       6.0         35.1       10.4         37.7       43.3         8.6       8.2         8.7       1.1         3.9       -0.6         -0.8       -14.0         25.0       26.0         Q3 07-08       Q4 07-08         8.8       8.8         18.5       24.0	Apr-Aug 08         Sep-08         Oct-08           4.8         6.0         0.1           35.1         10.4         -12.1           37.7         43.3         10.6           8.6         8.2         -0.1           8.7         1.1         -5.7           3.9         -0.6         -34.9           -0.8         -14.0         -7.7           25.0         26.0         -4.6           Q3 07-08         Q4 07-08         Q1 08-09           8.8         8.8         7.9           18.5         24.0         31.4	Apr-Aug 08         Sep-08         Oct-08         Nov-08           4.8         6.0         0.1         1.7           35.1         10.4         -12.1         -9.9           37.7         43.3         10.6         6.1           8.6         8.2         -0.1         1.3           8.7         1.1         -5.7         -4.6           3.9         -0.6         -34.9         -48.0           -0.8         -14.0         -7.7         -13.6           25.0         26.0         -4.6         -3.5           Q3 07-08         Q4 07-08         Q1 08-09         Q2 08-09           8.8         8.8         7.9         7.6           18.5         24.0         31.4         34.6	Apr-Aug 08         Sep-08         Oct-08         Nov-08         Dec-08           4.8         6.0         0.1         1.7         -0.6           35.1         10.4         -12.1         -9.9         -1.1           37.7         43.3         10.6         6.1         8.8           8.6         8.2         -0.1         1.3         3.0           8.7         1.1         -5.7         -4.6         0.0           3.9         -0.6         -34.9         -48.0         -58.2           -0.8         -14.0         -7.7         -13.6         -12.6           25.0         26.0         -4.6         -3.5         -18.6           Q3 07-08         Q4 07-08         Q1 08-09         Q2 08-09         Q3 08-09           8.8         8.8         7.9         7.6         5.3           18.5         24.0         31.4         34.6         13.3	Apr-Aug 08         Sep-08         Oct-08         Nov-08         Dec-08         Jan-09           4.8         6.0         0.1         1.7         -0.6         -0.5           35.1         10.4         -12.1         -9.9         -1.1         -15.9           37.7         43.3         10.6         6.1         8.8         -18.2           8.6         8.2         -0.1         1.3         3.0         2.9           8.7         1.1         -5.7         -4.6         0.0         -0.4           3.9         -0.6         -34.9         -48.0         -58.2         -52.3           -0.8         -14.0         -7.7         -13.6         -12.6           25.0         26.0         -4.6         -3.5         -18.6           Q3 07-08         Q4 07-08         Q1 08-09         Q2 08-09         Q3 08-09           8.8         8.8         7.9         7.6         5.3           18.5         24.0         31.4         34.6         13.3		

Source: CSO, Ministry of Commerce, CMIE and Economic Times.



## Growth Prospects: 2008-09 and 2009-10





- Methodology:
  - Use of an index of leading economic indicators (LEI)
  - Also a external shock in the form of a dummy variable





- LEI Consists of:
  - (i) production of machinery and equipment
  - (ii) non-food credit
  - (iii) railway freight traffic
  - (iv) cement sales
  - (v) net sales of the corporate sector
  - (vi) fuel and metal prices
  - (vii) real rate of interest
  - (viii) BSE sensex and
  - (ix) exports


# Index of Leading Economic Indicators (LEI)....



- Composite index constructed for 1997-08 with quarterly growth series
- Principal component index (PCI) method
  - Weights assigned through iteration process based on the contribution to total variation in the composite index
- LEI predicts future growth based on the past, 5-quarter in advance
- Cannot capture the effects of sudden external shocks having immediate impact on growth
  - East Asia crisis, 1997-98
  - Dotcom bust and September 11 incident in 2000-01 and 2001-02
  - Crop failure in 2002-03
  - Current shock of US financial crisis in 2008-09 and 2009-10

#### External Shocks & India's GDP Growth






External shocks bring down India's growth sharply







The estimated equation for GDP growth forecast, given below, is satisfactory with adjusted **R-square** value of **0.65** and all the **co-efficients** significant at **99% level**.

GrGDPt = 
$$7.98 + 1.34$$
 LEI (t-5) -  $3.70$  Dummy (4.70) (-7.56)



#### Growth Prospects of India

•Based on leading Indicators and a shock variable to incorporate the global crisis, the growth rates for 2008-09 and 2009-10 are projected as:

#### GDP Growth Forecast for 2008-09 and 2009-10

	No Shock	With Shock	Shock Moderated by Policy Response
2008-09	7.9	6.3	6.3
2009-10	8.4	4.8	5.5

Three scenarios of growth and third one assumes the impact of policy stimulus

#### Concluding Remarks




- India is seriously affected by the global crisis
- Growth to come down sharply but not below zero
- Soundness of banking, cautious capital account opening, and high reserve level have saved the country
- Recovery possible in late 2009-10 or early 2010-11 provided the government is able to push through massive investment in social and physical infrastructure through public-private participation
- Structural and procedural reforms imperatives for restoring confidence and to raise the potential growth rate
- Huge fiscal deficits and record debt levels will damage recovery prospects



### Thank You.

### Deepening Global Integration (Current Account & Capital Account as % GDP)



- Current account transactions rising from less than 20% of GDP to 50%
- •Both current and capital account transactions from less than a third of GDP to over 115%