

# Pan-European Financial Regulation

Nicolas Véron New Delhi, 11 November 2009

## re.

### **About Bruegel**

- Non-partisan, research-based think tank
- Aim: contribute to better economic policymaking in Europe
  - Wide range of research issues
    - ➤ Growth policies, cross-border integration, monetary policy, trade, migration, capital markets, higher education, energy / climate change...
  - At all levels of economic policymaking (national, EU, global)
- Innovative non-profit, public-private governance
  - Membership = governments + companies
    - > Currently 19 EU member states, 18 corporate members + EIB
  - Most funding from subscriptions; limited project-based funding
- Started operations in 2005
  - 25<sup>+</sup> staff in Brussels + visiting and non-residents fellows
- More on <u>www.bruegel.org</u>



## Institutional Overhaul in the European Union

#### Larosiere Report to the European Commission (Feb. 2009)

- 'Macro': European Systemic Risk Council / Board
- 'Micro': European System of Financial Supervisors
  - ➤ Three European Supervisory Authorities
  - > on Banking; Securities and Markets; Insurance and Occupational Pensions

#### Fast-track decision-making


- 27 May: Communication of the European Commission
- 19 June: political decision (European Council)
- 23 September: draft legislation
- December?: agreement of the Council (member states)
- 2010?: finalisation and implementation



## **Optimal Regulatory Structure?**

- Longstanding debate
- Three main families
  - Sectoral (Banking / Insurance / Securities): e.g. US, FR, ES, IT
  - Functional / "Twin Peaks" (prudential / conduct-of-business): e.g. NL, AU
  - Integrated (one authority): e.g. UK 1998, DE 2004, PL 2008
- Wide variations within each family
  - Especially on role of Central Bank
  - Inherently different in the Euro Area
    - > National Central Banks in Eurosystem: no independent monetary policy
- Shifts of pendulum
  - Early 2000s: FSA emulated in several EU member states, eg BAFin
  - Currently, tendency to separate prudential function
  - Empirical evidence inconclusive on relative performances
- EU level: not a nation-state; accountability implications

## The EU challenge: Financial Integration





## **Challenges from Financial Integration**

#### Pressure for cross-border level-playing field

- Harmonised regulation
- Consistent supervisory practices
- EU response: Basel 2 / Capital Requirements Directive,
  "Lamfalussy process" for rulemaking and enforcement

#### Supervisory effectiveness

- Risk monitoring e.g. Germany / Ireland
- Crisis management and resolution



## The European Systemic Risk Board

#### Brings together

- ECB (chair & secretariat)
- European Commission, National Central Banks (x27), European Supervisory Authorities (x3)
- Non-voting: Chair of EU Economic & Financial Committee,
  National Supervisors

#### Policy recommendations

- Non-binding, not necessarily public
- Macro-prudential impact?
- Differences with proposed US approach



## **New European Supervisory Authorities**

- "Lamfalussy Architecture" (2001, 2004)
  - 3 EU Committees: Securities, Banking, Insurance and Pensions
  - But no actual decision-making
- Tasks of 3 new Authorities (Commission proposal)
  - Legal personality + binding decisions, applicable to national authorities and/or market participants
  - In cases of non-compliance with EU rules; emergencies; disagreements
  - Single rulebook
- Governance and funding
- Prospects for "mission creep"



## The Next Steps

#### Short term: fixing the banking crisis

- A Japanese scenario?
- Necessity of triage
- Difficulty compounded by cross-border linkages
- European Banking Authority not part of short-term solution

#### Long term: making cross-border banking sustainable

- 2-tier supervision
- Crisis management & resolution
- The burden-sharing question

## **Thank You For Your Attention**

Nicolas Véron +32 473 815 372, n.veron@bruegel.org

www.bruegel.org