Emerging Trends in Global Economic Governance:

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Some emerging trends?

 Increasing dis-engagement in multi-lateral governance structure?

 Better self-governance in the shadow of increased globalization?

- Trend #1? Increasing dis-engagement with multilateral governance structure
 - Disenchantment with the IMF?
 - Build-up of FX reserve as a way to reduce reliance on a global financial architecture
 - Proliferation of regional initiatives
 - E.g., Changmai initiative, Chavez initiative
 - The "death" of the WTO Doha Round
 - E.g., "(Hilary) Clinton doubts benefits of Doha Round Revival" (FT December 3, 2007)

- Trend # 1: Increasing dis-engagement with multilateral governance structure? Not so fast
 - Disenchantment with the IMF?
 - No voice -> exit? Europe is the bottleneck?
 - India fares far better
 - Build-up of FX reserve
 - The special challenge of a large emerging market economy
 - Could the reserve dissipate as far as it has been built up?
 - Proliferation of regional initiatives
 - Has not been tested. Could be complements rather than substitutes
 - The "death" of Doha
 - Why about the eagerness for non-members to join the club?

 Trend #2? Better self-governance in the shadow of increased globalization

- Firm level
- Government level

Easy Money Effect vs Discipline effect

 Trend #2? Better self-governance in the shadow of increased globalization

 Evidence supportive of the existence of this trend is stronger and more persuasive

 Because some of the evidence comes from me ©

Example at Firm Level


 Does trade globalization induce better corporate governance voluntarily?

Mechanism

- Trade globalization (including foreign tariff reductions)
 - -> Firms' export opportunity improves -> they may wish to expand their production and may need more financing.
- To obtain more external financing, they may have to improve their corporate governance, including better financial disclosure, in order to make themselves more attractive to investors and creditors

- One can check
 - Whether foreign trade liberalization leads to voluntary improvement in corporate disclosure
 - Tong and Wei (2007)
 - 1200 listed firms in 50 countries during 1990-2004.
 - Useful features:
 - (a) The positive shock to firms' growth opportunity

 foreign trade liberalization is exogenous to the
 firms' corporate governance activities
 - (b) Tariff data are very detailed



How to measure disclosure?

Not the one on the left.

Quality of disclosure = forecasting accuracy of firm earnings by stock analysts,

Standard in the accounting literature

Key Findings of Tong and Wei (2007):

1200 firms in 50 countries 1990-2004


- Firms facing a greater increase in foreign trade opportunities show a greater improvement in their financial disclosure
 - 1 sd reduction in foreign tariffs -> 17% improvement in disclosure quality
- This effect is stronger for firms in sectors that have a higher intrinsic demand for external financing
- Financial globalization does not have the same effect

- Trend #2? Better self-governance in the shadow of increased globalization
- Example 2: At the Government Level
- Do governments pursue more responsible macroeconomic policies (e.g., lower inflation, and lower fiscal deficit) in response to increased cross-border capital flows?


General trends

Medians by period	1975:79	1980:84	1985:89	1990:94	1995:99
	Inflation (% p.a.)				
Developing Countries	11.84	14.39	15.24	13.83	7.99
Industrial Countries	10.01	9.66	4.63	3.27	1.95
	Budget deficit (% GDP)				
Developing Countries	4.23	4.60	3.17	1.46	1.57
Industrial Countries	3.80	5.05	3.30	3.90	1.88
	Exposure to Financial Globalization: Gross foreign assets and liabilities (% GDP)				
Developing Countries	6.36	9.92	12.73	16.87	28.27
Industrial Countries	9.28	33.76	67.07	106.71	136.27

Log Inflation and Financial Globalization



Budget Deficit and Financial Globalization



More systematic evidence?

 Tytell and Wei (2005): global capital flows and national macroeconomic policies

Method #1: Linear system of equations

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Log Inflation _{it} = \beta_i + \beta_t + \beta_1 Budget Deficit _{it} + \beta_2 Financial Openness _{it} + \beta_3 Exchange Rate Flexibility _{it} + \beta_4 Central Bank Governors _{it} + \beta_5 Trade Openness _{it} + \beta_6 Industrial Countries _i + u_{it}
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Budget Deficit _{it} = \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \alpha_1 Log Inflation _{it} + \alpha_2 Financial Openness _{it} + \alpha_3 Government Changes _{it} + \alpha_4 Government Coalitions _{it} + \alpha_5 Trade Openness _{it} + \alpha_6 Industrial Countries _i + \varepsilon_{it}
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Instrument for Financial Openness: distanceweighted average across neighboring countries

Method # 2:

Transition matrix specification:

Markov chains with variable transition probabilities (as a function of a country's exposure to financial globalization)

- Key Findings of Tytell and Wei:
- Robust evidence that exposure to FG induces governments to pursue low-inflation monetary policies
 - Accounting for history, central bank independence, exchange rate regime, and trade openness
- No support for the notion that globalization has induced lower deficits

Summary:

- Some robust evidence that globalization has induced improvement in economic government at both corporate and government levels
- Not a panacea (e.g., doesn't work for fiscal policies)
- Better to make friends with globalization than to stay away from it forever.



"Can Billy come out and compete in the global economy?"