



POLICY BRIEF #69

A Difficult Ministerial: Negotiations, Outcomes, and Strategic Implications from WTO MC14

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Abstract

The fourteenth WTO Ministerial Conference (MC14), held in Cameroon in 2026, unfolded against a backdrop of institutional challenges, including a weakened dispute resolution system and ongoing stalemate in multilateral negotiations, as well as divisions over plurilateral initiatives. Although expectations were limited, the conference retained symbolic significance by reaffirming the WTO's emphasis on development and inclusivity. Key discussions addressed fisheries subsidies, investment facilitation, digital trade, agriculture, development priorities, and the broader agenda of WTO reform. This policy brief presents a clear overview of the principal areas of disagreement among member states and examines India's approach on these issues.

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Summary

The fourteenth Ministerial Conference (MC14) of the World Trade Organization (WTO), held in Cameroon in 2026, took place amid deep institutional strains, including a defunct dispute-settlement system, an impasse in multilateral negotiations, and sharp disagreement on the merits of plurilateral alternatives. *This Policy Brief provides a non-technical description of the main points of division among countries. It also describes and evaluates India's stance on each issue.*

Discussions covered key areas including fisheries subsidies, investment facilitation, e-commerce, agriculture, development issues, and WTO reform. Substantive progress was limited. A fisheries subsidies agreement entered into force, but negotiations on broader disciplines remain unresolved. The Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement exposed sharp divisions, with India blocking its incorporation into the WTO framework, triggering debate on the legitimacy of plurilateral approaches.

E-commerce negotiations saw a major setback as consensus could not be reached on extending the longstanding moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions, leading to its lapse for the first time since 1998. Agriculture negotiations remained deadlocked, particularly on public stockholding and subsidy reforms, reflecting enduring North-South tensions.

A defining feature of MC14 was the increasing shift toward plurilateral agreements, as groups of countries pursued progress outside the consensus-based system. This signals a structural transition in the WTO, raising concerns about fragmentation, inclusivity, and institutional legitimacy.

For India, MC14 underscores the need for strategic recalibration. Its traditional defensive stance risks isolation in an evolving system driven by coalition-based rulemaking. A more proactive approach, engaging selectively in plurilateral initiatives while safeguarding core interests, will be critical to shaping future global trade governance.

A Difficult Ministerial Negotiations, Outcomes, and Strategic Implications from WTO MC14

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1. Introduction: Crisis and Continuity in the WTO

MC 14 was convened against the backdrop of the WTO facing a sustained period of institutional stress since the late 2010s. The paralysis of the Appellate Body since 2019 has effectively disabled the organization's dispute settlement function. At the same time, the failure to conclude major multilateral negotiations has undermined confidence in the WTO's ability to deliver meaningful outcomes.

Expectations were therefore modest for MC14, but the meetings nonetheless carried significant symbolic importance. Hosting the conference in Cameroon underscored the WTO's continued emphasis on development and inclusivity, particularly with respect to African economies. However, the broader geopolitical context, characterized by the US-China rivalry, a resurgence of industrial policy, and supply chain reconfiguration—shaped both the agenda and the outcomes of the conference.

2. Agenda

The agenda of MC14 was comprehensive, covering both legacy issues and emerging areas of trade governance. Its six core pillars included:

- Fisheries subsidies
- Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement
- E-commerce work programme and moratorium
- Agriculture
- Development issues
- WTO Reform

3. Issue-by-Issue Analysis

3.1 Fisheries Subsidies

The WTO Agreement on Fisheries (WT/MIN (22)/33 of 17 June 2022), which introduces disciplines on subsidies that contribute to overfishing and illegal fishing, has now entered into force following the required number of ratifications. However, negotiations on the second phase of the agreement—aimed at regulating a broader range of subsidy categories—remain highly contentious.

3.2 Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD)

The Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement—sponsored and supported by 129 of the WTO’s 166 Members as a plurilateral initiative—was brought forward for a decision on its incorporation into the WTO framework under Annex 4 of the Marrakesh Agreement. Proponents emphasized that formal incorporation would help unlock investment opportunities in developing economies and demonstrate renewed confidence in the multilateral trading system.

The Investment Facilitation for Investment Agreement (IFDA) is, by design, modest in scope. It does not address market access, investment protection, or investor–state dispute settlement. Instead, it focuses on improving transparency, streamlining administrative procedures, and fostering cooperation between governments and investors. IFDA remains open to all WTO members to join in the future. As the Agreement focuses on procedural improvements, participating members’ domestic regulations will, most likely, not be applied in a discriminatory manner to non-signatories.

India is not a participant in the initiative. It went further by blocking the participants’ proposal to incorporate the Agreement into the WTO’s legal framework, maintaining that investment does not fall within the scope of trade issues covered by the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO. India also warned that plurilateral agreements should not be used in ways that bypass or weaken existing multilateral mandates.

Undeterred by India’s use of its ‘veto’ under the consensus principle, the 129 participants in the IFD Agreement subsequently issued a Joint Ministerial Declaration (WT/MIN(26)/32, dated 29 March 2026) reaffirming their strong collective commitment to ensuring the timely entry into force and implementation of the Agreement within the WTO framework. Looking ahead, *it is likely* that the participants will pursue an interim implementation mechanism—similar to the approach used for the E-commerce Joint Statement Initiative—to operationalize the Agreement as soon as possible.

India later defended its position in a Press Release issued on 31 March 2026, stating that “IFD incorporation risks eroding the foundational principles and functional limits of the WTO.” It underscored that, within the broader WTO reform discussions, Members are seeking clear guardrails and legal safeguards for plurilateral initiatives before any such outcomes can be integrated into the WTO framework. On this basis, India declined to support the incorporation of the IFD Agreement as an Annex 4 Agreement. It emphasized that, given the systemic implications, it remained open to engaging in good-faith, comprehensive discussions under the WTO Reform Agenda.

India nevertheless drew strong criticism for single-handedly blocking an agreement backed by a large majority of developing and least developed country participants. The move also raised doubts about India’s self-declared leadership role within the Global South. However, the press release—signalling some openness to incorporating plurilateral agreements into the

WTO acquis with specific guardrails and legal safeguards—helped soften some of this backlash, as several Members interpreted India’s language as leaving space for a potential future shift in its position.

An overview of the substantive provisions of IFD is set out at Annex 1.

3.3 Electronic Commerce

There are two parallel streams of discussion on e-commerce at the WTO.

The *first* is the multilateral work programme, where the central issue is the moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions. Introduced in 1998 and repeatedly extended, the moratorium has become increasingly contentious. Developed countries, particularly the United States, have pushed to make it permanent, departing from the long-standing practice of renewing it from one Ministerial Conference to the next. Several developing countries have opposed its continuation, citing concerns over potential revenue losses and constraints on their digital industrial policy space.

After extensive negotiations, the Chair of the relevant group indicated that Members were moving toward convergence on extending the moratorium until 31 December 2030, as reflected in the Draft Decision on E-commerce (WT/MIN(26)/31). Since 1998, India has consistently, albeit reluctantly, acquiesced to the continuation of the e-commerce moratorium. While it has repeatedly voiced concerns regarding potential revenue losses and the erosion of policy space, it has stopped short of formally blocking its adoption. At MC14, for the first time since the moratorium’s inception, its extension failed—reportedly due to Brazil and Turkey withholding support.

In response to the expiry of the moratorium on e-commerce transmissions, 23 Members issued a joint statement on 1 April 2026 (WT/GC/283) committing, on a temporary and plurilateral basis, to maintain among themselves the existing practice of not imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions. India was not a signatory.

The *second* stream consists of the parallel plurilateral negotiations on e-commerce. Sixty-six participants in this initiative issued a joint press release at the Ministerial, announcing that they “have adopted a clear and immediate pathway to implement the world’s first baseline set of global digital trade rules”. They emphasized that, because their proposals to add the Agreement on Electronic Commerce to Annex 4 of the Marrakesh Agreement—submitted in documents WT/GC/W/963 of 18 February 2025 and 16 December 2025—failed to secure consensus, they now intend to proceed with implementation independently, subject to the completion of required domestic procedures.

An overview of the E-Commerce Agreement is set out in Annex 2.

3.4 Agriculture

India has been actively advocating for an Agreement on Public Stockholding for food security purposes within the WTO. A decision was adopted vide documents WT/MIN(13)/38 and WT/L/913 dated 11 December 2013, adopted at the Bali Ministerial Conference (MC9), to negotiate a permanent solution to the issue of public stockholding for food security. This solution was expected to be concluded and adopted by MC11 in 2017, four years later.

In the interim, until a permanent solution is agreed upon, WTO Members committed not to challenge, through the Dispute Settlement Mechanism, any developing country's compliance with its subsidy obligations related to support for traditional staple food crops under public stockholding programmes for food security. This effectively protects India's Minimum Support Price (MSP) scheme for agricultural commodities from dispute challenges at the WTO.

Despite this interim safeguard, the permanent solution envisioned in the Ministerial Declaration has remained out of reach. India has consistently urged Members to finalize this agreement, emphasizing that the mandate to secure a permanent solution must be fulfilled independently and without linkage to other issues.

A recent statement titled *Dialogue on Emerging Agriculture Trade Issues* (WT/MIN/(26)40, dated 31 March 2026) was issued jointly by Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Iceland, Liechtenstein, New Zealand, Peru, Switzerland, Ukraine, and Uruguay. The initiative aims to address the rapid evolution of agricultural policies driven by food security concerns, environmental pressures, and shifts in production systems.

One notable aspect of the statement is the alignment of Iceland, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein, countries traditionally cautious about agricultural liberalization—with members of the Cairns Group, which are known advocates of liberalized agricultural trade. This unexpected coalition suggests a potentially significant shift in the dynamics of global agricultural trade discussions. Monitoring the activities of this group will be essential to understanding how international debates in this area may evolve.

3.5 Development and S&DT

Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT) remains a cornerstone of the WTO's development agenda. However, its application has become increasingly contested, particularly with respect to large emerging economies.

Developed countries, especially the United States, want "advanced developing countries" to undertake more stringent commitments. On the other hand, developing countries say this would undermine fairness as they still need the extra flexibility with respect to global trade rules because they face greater economic challenges. It grants them more time to implement

commitments, lighter obligations, and special support for the poorest countries. The debate today is mainly about whether these benefits are effective, whether big emerging economies should still qualify, and how to update the system so that it remains fair without weakening the protections in place for the organization’s poorer members.

MC14 did not resolve these tensions, and the issue will feature prominently in the WTO reform agenda.

3.6 WTO Reform

A revised *Declaration and Work Plan on WTO Reform* was developed after extensive member consultations, but it could not be formally adopted. The Chair advised Members to continue their work with the aim of adopting the Declaration and Work Plan at the next General Council meeting in May 2026 (Annex to the MC14 Chair’s Summary, WT/MIN(26)/35).

In the run-up to MC14, the Reform Work Plan addressed issues such as decision-making, development (including S&DT), and level-playing-field concerns. At the Ministerial, discussions broadened to include foundational and systemic questions, notably core WTO principles and the balance of rights and obligations. These themes are expected to remain central to the post-MC14 reform agenda.

India, together with South Africa and Oman, issued a statement on WTO Reform (WT/MIN(26)/W/26, 29 March 2026) affirming their willingness to engage constructively on identified areas, including decision-making, development, S&DT, and level-playing-field issues.

Looking ahead, India will need to formulate concrete proposals on “guardrails and legal safeguards” for plurilateral agreements before any such initiative can be incorporated into the WTO’s legal framework. This follows from India’s own press release of 31 March 2026, which invoked these concerns to justify its decision to block the integration of the IFD plurilateral.

4. Moving towards structural transformation of the WTO

No major breakthroughs were made at MC14. However, the absence of major breakthroughs should not obscure the broader significance of MC14 as a marker of systemic transition.

Three interrelated axes of conflict shaped negotiations at MC14. First, the traditional divide between developed and developing countries persisted, particularly on issues such as agriculture and digital trade.

Second, strategic rivalry between the United States and China is increasingly shaping positions on systemic reform and industrial policy. The renewed push for industrial policy—through measures such as the US Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS Act, and the EU Green Deal—has

intensified pressures on the global trading system, as governments deploy subsidies, localisation requirements, and strategic investments to drive resilience, technological leadership, and climate objectives. Many of these interventions, particularly from the US, carry clear overtones of US–China economic and technological competition.

These policies sit uneasily with existing World Trade Organization rules, which were designed to constrain state intervention and uphold market-based principles. The resulting tensions are now central to discussions across WTO fora, including committees on subsidies and trade and environment, as well as broader reform debates. Members are struggling to reconcile green industrial policy and national security priorities with established disciplines on subsidies and non-discrimination.

There is a clear divergence between developed and developing countries in the design of industrial policy. Developed economies increasingly favour sector-specific strategies, concentrating support on advanced and strategic industries. Examples include the United States’ initiatives to strengthen AI-related semiconductor production and the European Union’s targeted incentives for green and climate-aligned technologies. These interventions aim to secure technological leadership, reduce strategic dependencies, and reinforce high-value segments of global supply chains.

In contrast, developing countries generally seek broader policy flexibility to build foundational industrial capacity across multiple sectors, reflecting the need to diversify production, upgrade technology, and create employment at scale.

The two groups also differ in their preferred policy instruments. Advanced economies favour market-based *tools* that mobilize private capital toward strategic sectors without overtly distorting competition, such as innovation-linked tax incentives, green bonds, carbon pricing, credit guarantees, etc. Developing countries often prefer more *direct capacity-building measures* to overcome structural disadvantages and nurture domestic industries (the infant-industry argument), including direct public subsidies, tariff protection, local content requirements, preferential credit, export promotion transfers, etc.

In addition, heterogeneity within the developing world itself has complicated coalition-building, as large emerging economies and least developed countries often have divergent priorities.

A notable feature of MC14 was the increasing reliance on plurilateral approaches. Faced with the difficulty of achieving consensus among all members, subsets of countries have pursued agreements in areas such as e-commerce and investment facilitation.

Members took effective steps to sideline naysayers (like India) by issuing declarations to implement plurilateral agreements amongst them unilaterally, pending recourse to incorporation into the WTO acquis. This transformation reflects both the limitations of consensus-based decision-making and the need for flexibility in a diverse membership.

While this approach enables progress, it raises important questions about the future of the organisation, including its legitimacy, inclusivity, and effectiveness, which will become important issues in the WTO Reform debate going forward.

5. Strategic Implications for India

India has historically adopted a largely defensive posture within the WTO, treating the institution as a “necessary evil.” This approach has centered on consistently striving to limit the WTO’s mandate while prioritizing special and differential treatment for developing countries and preserving domestic policy space for its development objectives. Moreover, India has consistently opposed plurilateral agreements on the grounds that they undermine multilateralism, and has chosen not to join any such initiatives. Relying on the WTO’s consensus-based decision-making process, India has blocked efforts to integrate plurilateral agreements into the organization’s framework, even when these agreements have the support of a large majority of WTO members. In doing so, India is effectively constraining the WTO’s negotiating function and limiting any expansion of its mandate. Through this process, India has come to be viewed by some as a significant obstacle within the WTO, a characterization that parallels critiques often directed at the United States.

As India has become the world’s sixth-largest economy and more deeply integrated into global markets, maintaining such a defensive stance has become increasingly difficult. Persisting with this approach risks global isolation and carries growing risks in a system that is steadily shifting toward coalition-based rule-making.

Given India’s expanding economic weight and its development strategy focused on attracting cutting-edge technology and capital, a strategic recalibration is essential. India must position itself not merely as a rule-taker but as an active contributor to shaping the future architecture of global trade governance.

There is a second, even more strategic concern. When a critical mass of WTO Members—particularly major economies—advances plurilateral agreements that establish regulatory norms with a liberalizing orientation, those norms inevitably become the de facto global standard. Whether they are formally multilateral is becoming increasingly irrelevant. Global value chains, investment flows, and regulatory cooperation tend to align with the rules adopted by the most economically influential players. Countries that stay out do not escape these rules; they simply lose the ability to shape them.

India should, therefore, consider participating in plurilateral initiatives where its interests align—particularly in areas such as digital trade, investment facilitation, and green supply chains. These are precisely the domains where global rules are still fluid and where India has substantial interests.

In the context of digital trade, India's profile and interests differ markedly from those of a typical developing country. Its role as a global supplier of ICT services has expanded significantly: it now accounts for roughly 35% of the global IT services market, ranks as the fourth-largest exporter of digitally delivered services, and recorded USD 257 billion in such exports in 2023—surpassing the combined total of all other low- and middle-income countries. Given this position, India has a clear strategic interest in an open digital trade environment and would benefit from adopting a more forward-leaning posture in negotiations, including positioning itself as a demandeur for the continuation of the e-commerce moratorium.

India has made significant progress by pursuing ambitious Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with partners such as the EU, the United Kingdom, EFTA, and the United States. While this marks an important and forward-looking shift, India should also carefully consider whether bilateral agreements alone can substitute for active participation in a strong and modern multilateral trading system capable of addressing 21st-century challenges. For an economy that is expanding rapidly and undergoing substantial modernization, a robust multilateral framework remains essential. Its insistence on pure multilateralism, rather than adopting a more pragmatic approach that includes plurilateral engagement, increasingly appears to prioritize an idealized vision over achievable and beneficial outcomes.

India should adopt a dual-track strategy, engaging selectively in plurilateral initiatives while defending core interests, including through constructive engagement in developing 'guardrails and legal safeguards' with a view to preserving the foundational principles of the multilateral trading system. It should look beyond developing country coalitions and also invest in coalition-building with other emerging economies and middle powers, develop a proactive digital trade policy, and align domestic reforms with its external negotiating strategy. By doing so, India can move from a reactive to a proactive role within the WTO.

Annexure

Annex 1

WTO Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement

1. Background and Participation

The Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) Agreement is a plurilateral initiative within the World Trade Organization (WTO), formally concluded on 25 February 2024 at MC13 (Abu Dhabi).

- Participation: ~129 WTO Members
- Includes: 91 developing countries and 27 Least Developed Countries (LDCs)
- Binding only on participating Members; open to accession

2. Core Objective

The Agreement aims to improve the global investment climate, facilitate foreign direct investment (FDI), and promote sustainable development, particularly in developing and LDC Members.

- Excludes market access commitments
- Excludes investment protection
- Excludes Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)

3. Structural Overview of the Agreement

Section I – Scope and General Principles

- Defines scope and application
- Includes Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) treatment
- Introduces a 'firewall provision' separating it from other investment treaties

Section II – Transparency

- Publication of laws, procedures, and requirements
- Online information portals
- Opportunity to comment on draft regulations
- WTO notification obligations

Section III – Administrative Efficiency

- Streamlined authorization procedures
- Online submission of applications
- Acceptance of authenticated documents
- Clear timelines, fees, and review mechanisms

Section IV – Regulatory Cooperation

- National focal points for investors
- Improved regulatory coordination
- Cross-border cooperation
- Supplier databases and development programmes

4. Development Dimension

Section V – Special & Differential Treatment (SD&T)

- Tailored implementation timelines
- Technical assistance and capacity building
- Flexibility for developing and LDC Members

5. Sustainability and Governance

Section VI – Sustainable Investment

- Responsible Business Conduct (RBC)
- Anti-corruption measures

Section VII – Institutional Framework

- WTO IFD Committee
- Dispute settlement provisions
- Exceptions and final clauses

6. Key Features

- Focus on process efficiency rather than substantive rights
- Emphasis on transparency and predictability
- Reduces administrative barriers to investment
- Encourages sustainable investment flows

Source: Investment Facilitation for Development Agreement (WTO Document circulated vide INF/IFD/55 dated 13 February 2024)

Annex 2

WTO E-Commerce Plurilateral Agreement

The WTO Joint Statement Initiative (JSI) on Electronic Commerce is a plurilateral effort by a group of WTO members to establish common global rules governing digital trade. After five years of negotiations, participants reached a “stabilised text” of an Agreement on Electronic Commerce in July 2024. The initiative reflects the growing importance of the digital economy and aims to create a predictable, transparent, and non-discriminatory regulatory environment for cross-border electronic commerce, while supporting inclusive growth and digital transformation, particularly for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs).

The agreement is structured across multiple thematic sections. At its core, it seeks to **enable electronic commerce** by ensuring that digital transactions are legally recognised. Members are encouraged to adopt frameworks consistent with international standards (such as UNCITRAL models), and are required not to deny legal validity to electronic signatures, contracts, or invoices solely because they are in digital form. The agreement also promotes paperless trading, requiring governments to make trade-related forms available electronically and encouraging the acceptance of digital documents as legally equivalent to paper versions. This is complemented by provisions on single-window systems and interoperability to streamline customs and regulatory processes.

A second pillar focuses on **openness in digital trade**. A key commitment is the prohibition of customs duties on electronic transmissions. The agreement also encourages open government data policies, requiring that publicly available data be accessible in machine-readable formats where possible. In addition, it recognises the importance of ensuring that users can access and use the internet freely, subject to reasonable network management practices.

The agreement places strong emphasis on **building trust in the digital economy**. It requires members to adopt measures protecting consumers from fraudulent or misleading online practices, regulate unsolicited commercial electronic messages (spam), and establish legal frameworks for personal data protection. Cybersecurity cooperation is also encouraged, including information sharing and adoption of risk-based approaches to managing digital threats. These provisions aim to increase confidence among consumers and businesses engaging in e-commerce.

Another important component is **transparency, cooperation, and development**. Members must publish relevant laws and regulations affecting e-commerce and cooperate on regulatory and policy issues. Recognising disparities in digital capacity, the agreement provides flexibilities for developing and least-developed countries, including extended implementation periods and access to technical assistance and capacity-building support. This is intended to bridge the digital divide and enable broader participation in the global digital economy.

Finally, the agreement includes standard WTO provisions on **exceptions, dispute settlement, and institutional arrangements**, ensuring consistency with existing WTO rules such as GATT and GATS. It also establishes a committee to oversee implementation and future development. Importantly, the agreement remains open to additional WTO members and acknowledges that certain digital trade issues remain unresolved, leaving scope for future negotiations and amendments. Overall, the JSI e-commerce agreement represents a significant step toward creating a coherent global framework for digital trade, though it remains a plurilateral initiative rather than a universally adopted WTO agreement.

The **openness in the digital trade** pillar of the JSI agreement combines a small number of hard, legally binding commitments with a broader set of softer “best endeavour” provisions.

The most significant **binding obligation** is the prohibition on customs duties on electronic transmissions. The agreement states that no Party shall impose customs duties on electronic transmissions between persons of different Parties. This is a clear, enforceable rule and effectively locks in the long-standing WTO moratorium practice into treaty form among participants. However, the provision is carefully framed—it explicitly allows governments to impose **internal taxes or charges**, provided these are consistent with existing WTO rules, preserving fiscal policy space.

Beyond this, much of the openness framework relies on **non-binding or best endeavour commitments**. For example, provisions on **open government data** encourage (but do not require) Parties to make data available in machine-readable, searchable formats, updated regularly, and at low or no cost. Similarly, governments are encouraged to avoid imposing restrictions that would limit reuse of such data. These are framed as “shall endeavour” or “are encouraged,” meaning they are not enforceable obligations but directional policy commitments.

The same pattern applies to **internet access principles**. The agreement recognises the benefits of users being able to access lawful content, use applications of their choice, and connect devices freely. However, it explicitly clarifies that Parties are **not required to adopt or maintain specific measures** to implement these principles, making this section largely aspirational rather than binding.

Overall, the openness pillar is deliberately calibrated: it includes one strong, enforceable rule (no customs duties on electronic transmissions) while leaving politically sensitive areas—such as data governance and internet regulation—under flexible, best endeavour language. This balance reflects the difficulty of achieving consensus on digital sovereignty issues while still advancing baseline openness in global digital trade.

The agreement **does not contain a binding rule that prohibits mandatory local storage of data (data localisation)**. The closest relevant provision is in the **personal data protection section**, which allows countries to adopt measures relating to data protection, including those

affecting cross-border data transfers. Crucially, it says countries can impose such measures **as long as they provide general conditions under which data transfers are allowed**. That's effectively a **broad policy carve-out**, not a restriction on localisation.

There is **no explicit obligation** along the lines of:

- “data must be allowed to flow freely across borders,” or
- “Parties shall not require data to be stored locally.”

Source: Agreement on Electronic Commerce circulated in a Joint Statement Initiative on Electronic Commerce document circulated by WTO vide INF/ECOM/87 dated 26 July 2024.



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