China’s Rare-Earth Leverage Isn’t Absolute- India’s Urban Mining Play

On 4 April 2025, China announced export restrictions on several rare-earth elements such as samarium, terbium, and dysprosium, materials that underpin electric vehicles, electronics, defence systems, and renewable-energy technologies. With roughly 60% of global mine output and a dominant share of refining, China’s licensing decisions reverberate through supply chains. As approvals slow, global automakers have signalled potential production delays, and European manufacturers report tighter inventories. India, now the world’s third-largest car market, is particularly exposed, and many domestic manufacturers import high-performance magnets and, in some cases, complete motor assemblies to navigate bottlenecks, thereby raising costs and heightening schedule risk.

Recent exchanges between the United States and China have placed critical minerals at the centre of trade discussions, underscoring a broader reality: import dependence on strategic materials is a vulnerability, not merely an accounting inconvenience. India cannot achieve durable self-reliance in clean energy, advanced electronics, or electric mobility while relying overwhelmingly on imported lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earths. The question is not whether to reduce dependence, but how to do so quickly, credibly, and at a greater scale.